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Abstract
Natural disasters can compromise the economy, solidity, and
social well-being of entire nations. To cope with natural risks,
some countries have established public-private partnerships
with the insurance industry, with generally satisfactorily
outcomes. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role
of these partnerships. Chapter 2 reviews the international
experience and investigates the main weaknesses of the
public-private insurance systems currently in force, that can
be traced back to poor risk understanding and inadequate
governance. Including risk management into development
plans can help ensuring effectiveness of risk reduction,
while a more inclusive approach can achieve a better risk
understanding. The following three chapters are devoted to
the Italian case study and define a public-private insurance
scheme for earthquakes and floods. As a first step, Chapter
3 estimates expected losses per individual and municipality
through risk-modeling. Chapter 4 defines the insurance
model, that departs from the existing literature by describing
a public-private insurance intended to relieve the financial
burden that natural events place on governments, while at
the same time assisting individuals and protecting the insur-
ance business. Though earthquakes generate expected losses
that are almost six times greater than floods, we found that
the amount of public funds needed to manage the two perils
is almost the same. Lastly, Chapter 5 tests whether jointly
managing the two perils can counteract the negative impact
of spatial correlation. Some benefit from risk diversification
emerged, though the probability of the government having
to inject further capital is still considerable.
xv
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Natural risks pose a broad range of social, financial, and economic
issues, with potentially long-lasting effects. Historically, governments
have mostly addressed the financial effects of natural events on an ad-
hoc basis, but countries are now increasingly focusing on proactive plan-
ning before a disaster strikes (World Bank, 2014). Among others, OECD,
G20 (OECD, 2012), the World Bank and GFDRR (World Bank, 2014) claim
that governments should guide citizens towards recovery by implement-
ing both risk reduction and financial protection. In particular, the World
Bank (2014) argues that “financial protection complements risk reduction by
helping a government address residual risk, which is either not feasible or not
cost effective to mitigate. Absent a sustainable risk financing strategy, [...], a
country with an otherwise robust disaster risk management approach can re-
main highly exposed to financial shocks, either to the government budget or to
groups throughout society”.
While guaranteeing social assistance, governments should at the
same time encourage private initiatives in prevention and financial pro-
tection. As emphasized by OECD (2015), improving public awareness
reduces the human-induced factors that make a major contribution to
the cost of disasters and alleviates losses on public finances. In particu-
lar, since private insurance is the main risk financing tool for businesses
and households, the OECD (2012) recommends that governments “assess
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their availability, adequacy and efficiency to the population and within the econ-
omy, as well as their costs and benefits relative to other types of possible risk
reduction measures”.
A series of challenges hinder the development of the insurance busi-
ness in protection from natural disasters. First of all, Kousky and Cooke
(2012) shows that spatial correlation creates the potential for enormous
losses at the aggregate level, and insurers therefore need to access a
large amount of capital in order to offer the cover and meet solvency
constraints. Consequently, they are often forced to drive up premiums,
which could become so high that it would not be rational for individuals
to purchase the policy. Large insurers can significantly reduce the prob-
ability of insolvency by pooling risks from more independent regions or
by transferring a portion of their portfolio through reinsurance. How-
ever, while lowering premiums for regions with a higher risk, this solu-
tion might raise those of those with a lower risk and, especially in a com-
petitive market, low risk-individuals might fail to purchase, therefore
leaving the company with an extremely risky pool. As shown by Char-
pentier and Le Maux (2014), the free market does not necessarily pro-
vide an efficient level of natural-catastrophe insurance, but government-
supported insurance allows losses from disasters to be spread equally
among policyholders thanks to the government’s easier access to credit.
Climate change also exacerbates these issues: the Geneva Association
(2013) warns that return periods and correlation among claims for sev-
eral high-loss extreme events are “ambiguous rather than simply uncertain”,
and raises concerns about the future sustainability of insurance business
on natural risks. Social assistance policies may also hinder the devel-
opment of private markets and increase the financial burden of natural
disasters on public finances due to charity hazard (World Bank, 2014).
Against this background, a number of economies have established
various forms of public-private co-operation to support the insurance
business, and several countries have decided to enter the market by
establishing a public-private company entirely devoted to insuring cit-
izens’ properties against natural disasters at a discounted price (e.g.
Spain, France, Australia, Turkey, New Zealand, Taiwan, USA, etc..). This
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strategy helps to strengthen the resilience of a community by promoting
the development of the insurance sector and allowing faster recovery
(Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010).
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of public-private part-
nerships in insurance for the management of natural disasters. Chapter
2 reviews the international experience and investigates the main weak-
nesses of the systems currently in force. We analyze the Government’s
perspective and we extend the existing literature by broadening the at-
tention to a wider number of stakeholders, rather than describing a two-
side relationship between the private insurers and the public bodies. The
aim of this work is in fact to investigate how public authorities can build
society’s resilience along with the overall community by agreeing and
designing a set of coherent actions that (1) protect the well-being of cit-
izens; (2) allow the achievement of the general development objectives;
(3) protect the private sector; (4) do not unduly weaken public resources.
In addition to the need to further invest in risk understanding, the main
problem encountered is weak governance. In particular, the manage-
ment of natural disasters has often not been included in the Countries’
development plans, and therefore risk reduction initiatives often collided
with urbanization and development choices. Uncontrolled development
and climate change are actually increasing natural risks faster than coun-
tries are able to reduce them, and it is therefore important to switch to a
more inclusive approach.
The following three chapters are devoted to the Italian case study and
progressively define a public-private insurance scheme for earthquakes
and floods. Italy is in fact highly exposed to natural risks, especially
earthquakes and floods, but there is currently no well-defined loss allo-
cation mechanism at national level. A few people insure their properties
(Maccaferri, Cariboni, and Campolongo, 2012) and expect social assis-
tance from the government instead. Each natural event is evaluated by
public authorities when it occurs, social assistance depends on the de-
cisions of the parties in charge and is therefore commensurate with the
financial resources available at the time. In recent years public debate
has increasingly shifted towards natural risk management and planning,
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although at the moment no initiative has been undertaken. In defining
the public-private insurance scheme for Italy, this thesis addresses three
issues, each covered in a specific chapter.
Chapter 3 estimates expected loss in case of lack of data on past losses.
Insurance companies need big loss database for premium rating, but
there is currently no source that collects information on natural impacts
in Italy at national level. Lack of data on the impacts of natural disasters
is a widespread issue and in order to overcome this problem, the world’s
biggest insurance companies have developed sophisticated models for
loss estimation based on engineering and geology studies. In this chap-
ter, we propose new techniques for measuring risks when historical data
lack. In particular, we refer to a previous model for the estimation of
earthquake losses, to which we introduce a more detailed representation
of the probability of earthquakes occurring. An alternative approach is
proposed for floods and our method contributes to the literature because
we are dealing with both lack of detailed information on the character-
istics of the basins as well as the scarcity of historical data. While better
accuracy of the estimates is desirable for the future, our models provide
a first quantification of losses at the individual and local level that allows
the relevant authorities to better appreciate the riskiness of the territory
and set the basis for the construction of a public insurance system.
Once losses have been estimated, Chapter 4 proposes the public-
private insurance model. Our model departs from the existing literature
by addressing a public-private partnership, which therefore modifies the
fundamental hypotheses of traditional insurance. Our contribution to
the literature can be summarized in three aspects. First, the purpose of
the business is social assistance, and premium collection serves solely to
risk management and to guarantee quick compensation to the damaged
population. Therefore, rates do not include any profit load and are com-
mensurate to citizens’ demand. Second, we introduce the government as
a social guarantor that contributes to reserves and provides public funds
in case reserves are not sufficient for claim compensation. Finally, our
model includes spatial correlation by applying the Hoeffding bound for
r-dependent random variables.
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Chapter 5 extends the insurance model to multi-hazard management.
As well known in finance, merging risk portfolios is beneficial only if
risks are uncorrelated, as floods and earthquakes are likely to be. It re-
mains to be seen whether the benefits from risk diversification counteract
the negative impact of spatial correlation.
Each of these three chapters presents and discusses the relative re-
sults. We found that seismic risk produces the highest expected losses
at national level, but floods may generate the highest losses per square
meter. The two perils differ in geographic extent: while the seismic risk
involves almost all the nation, floods concern approximately two thirds
of the territory. Though the seismic risks generate expected losses that
are almost six times greater than floods, we found that the amount of
public funds needed to manage them is almost the same. Our analysis
shows that the public-private insurer can benefit from risk differentia-
tion by jointly managing earthquake and flood risks through a multi-
hazard policy: the amount of public capital needed is lower than would
be necessary if the two risks were managed separately. Another desir-
able feature emerges: rates for multi-hazard policies are more geograph-
ically homogeneous, and therefore promote fairness perception among
the population. However, it emerged that under no circumstances does
the maximum premium that individuals are willing to pay match the
insurer capital constraints. Without the government as a guarantor, it
would therefore be impossible for the company to offer policies through-
out the whole territory.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and presents some works in progress
that were born from this project.
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Chapter 2
A review of public-private
partnerships for natural
risk management
The full text of the article is also available from the arXiv repository, preprint
number 2006.05845.
Abstract
This chapter reviews the role of public-private partnerships
in the management of natural risks, with particular attention
to the insurance sector. We show that four elements are nec-
essary for them to be effective: strong government financial
support, a great commitment to risk reduction, high citizen
participation and ongoing access to the reinsurance market.
Poor risk knowledge and weak governance have widely chal-
lenged these initiatives during the recent years, while the fu-
ture is threatened by climate change and unsustainable devel-
opment. We argue that a greater involvement of all segments
of the community, especially the weakest layers, is needed
and the management of natural risks should be included in a
sustainable development plan.
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2.1 Introduction
Natural risks pose a broad range of social, financial and economic
issues, with potentially long-lasting effects. Historically, governments
have mostly addressed the financial effects of natural events on an ad-
hoc basis, but, since the 1970s, a strong awareness-raising activity by
the United Nations has profoundly changed the attitude of the national
authorities.1 According to the United Nations, the activity of govern-
ments should not just be limited to guide citizens toward recovery in
the aftermath of an event but should rather prepare them and create the
conditions necessary to ensure rapid resilience. To this aim, OECD, G20
(OECD, 2012), the World Bank and GFDRR (World Bank, 2014), encour-
age countries to adopt a comprehensive disaster risk management strat-
egy, which should be articulated in a series of coherent and coordinated
actions, well distributed and defined over time and aimed at address-
ing each phase of a disaster. In particular, a strategy should include risk
assessment, risk reduction, preparedness, emergency response, and re-
covery.
Among these phases, all equally important, risk reduction is by far
the most complex to plan. Many tools able to reduce the financial impact
of natural events exist and can be divided into three categories based
1The United Nations dates the beginning of the global disaster risk reduction process
to the International Expert Group Meeting in July 1979, but the first International Frame-
work of Action - the international Decade for Disaster Reduction - began 10 years later, on
January 1990. Then framework has then been followed by the Yokohama Strategy in 1994.
In 1999 the United Nations established the UNDRR (United Nation office for Disaster Risk
Reduction), a secretariat dedicated to facilitating the implementation of the “International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction”. The office presented a first plan - the “Hyogo Frame-
work for Action 2005-2015” (United Nations, 2005) - to explain, describe and detail the
work that is required from all different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. When
the framework reached maturity, a 15-year-long, voluntary, non-binding agreement aiming
at “the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the
economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities
and countries” - the “Sendai Framework” (UNISDR, 2015) - was adopted by UN Member
States. A series of agreements - the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement on climate change,
the New Urban Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Agenda for Humanity
- then sought to coordinate risk reduction with the other global challenges. Other interna-
tional organizations are also involved in similar projects for the prevention, mitigation and
management of natural disaster risk, such as ADB (Asian Development Bank), FAO (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), OECD (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development) and the World Bank. For example, in 2012, G20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, along with G20 Leaders mandated the OECD to de-
velop a voluntary framework for strengthen disaster risk assessment and financing (OECD,
2012).
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on how the risk is addressed. We distinguish between risk mitigation,
risk retention and risk transfer. Risk mitigation acts on the physical
and environmental conditions responsible for the financial impact, there-
fore all structural interventions aimed at decreasing the probability of an
event occurring (e.g. reservoirs), the vulnerability of exposed assets (e.g.
retrofitting on private homes) or the number of goods and individuals
exposed (e.g. restricting building permission in high-risk areas) fall into
the first category. Since risks cannot be completely mitigated and struc-
tural interventions might not be cost-effective (Hudson, Botzen, et al.,
2016), a good risk management strategy should always include some de-
gree of financial protection (World Bank, 2014). Financial instruments2
for risk reduction can distribute the costs over time by accumulating suf-
ficient capital to face the expected losses of future events (risk retention),
or transfer the risk to specialized subjects, i.e. insurers and reinsurers,
or to the market through catastrophe linked securities. Both risk reten-
tion and transfer facilitate emergency response and speed up recovery
by providing resources in the immediate aftermath of an event.
The governments not only should select and adopt the most suitable
risk reduction measures but must also ensure that individuals have ac-
cess to them. Since private insurance on buildings and/or on other mov-
able assets is the main risk financing tool for businesses and households,
the OECD (2012) recommends that governments “assess their availability,
adequacy and efficiency to the population and within the economy, as well as
their costs and benefits relative to other types of possible risk reduction mea-
sures”. Nevertheless, a series of market failures endanger financial and
insurance markets3 and makes it necessary to further reduce the risks
2Two approaches to risk financing exist and correspond to different financial instru-
ments. Risks might be addressed ex post by means of existing resources and powers, or
ex ante with financial mechanisms explicitly arranged or secured beforehand. For exam-
ple, ex ante instruments that governments can rely on are reserve funds, contingent credit
facilities, re/insurance, catastrophe-linked securities. Examples of ex post financing are
budget reallocation, debt financing, borrowing and taxation. Note that ex post financing
does not preclude the establishment of institutional arrangements that specify, ex ante, the
government’s financial commitments (OECD, 2012).
3Main market failures in disaster risk management relate to the insurability of risks,
information asymmetry, adverse selection, consumer behavior, moral hazard and charity
hazard. As far as insurability concerns, spatial correlation among insured assets consti-
tutes a central issue for disaster management because generates the potential for enormous
losses to the insurers (Glauber, 2004). For example, a series of hurricanes in the US during
the 1990s led to a consistent number of insolvencies (Matthews et al., 1999; Mills, Lecomte,
and Peara, 2001). As a consequence, insurance included higher risk-load in premium rat-
ing for high-risk areas (Feldblum, 1990; Kreps, 1990; Meyers, 1996; Mango, 1997; Mango,
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before transferring them. In this respect, governments have often inter-
vened by investing in risk mitigation and increasing public awareness
among the population. In some cases, the costs of policies were pro-
hibitive for some segments of the population, and the authorities directly
intervened in the insurance market by establishing a public-private part-
nership. Though in some circumstances efforts of governments have al-
ready been substantial, the Geneva Association (2018) expects the role
of the insurance industry to become increasingly relevant in the next fu-
ture and urges governments to increase their commitment in monitor-
ing socio-economic risks of climate change, developing risk management
plans for all sectors of the economy, and establishing relevant public-
private partnerships with insurers to enhance socio-economic resilience.
The fragility of the insurance industry is only part of the complex
issues that countries face. Governments themselves are in fact signif-
icantly exposed to disaster risk: public exposures are large, including
human losses, injuries, damage to public goods, tax pressures resulting
from financial commitments and unplanned post-disaster financial as-
sistance, as well as potentially negative changes in macroeconomic con-
ditions such as possible lower economic growth or lower tax revenues.4
In order to protect the national financial stability, the Sendai Framework
claims that the government, while guaranteeing social assistance, should
share responsibilities with private stakeholders and therefore private ini-
tiatives in prevention and financial protection should be encouraged. As
emphasized by the OECD (2015), improving public awareness reduces
the human-induced factors that make a major contribution to the cost of
disasters and alleviates losses on public finances. However, educating
and informing the society is usually not enough.
fHence, if some degree of government involvement is necessary to
1998; Kreps, 1998), that often do not meet the demand from rational purchaser (Kousky
and Cooke, 2012). Along with behavioural bias (Kunreuther, 1996), climate change further
complicates the development of financial and insurance market. The Geneva Association
(2013) warns that return periods and correlation among claims for several high-loss ex-
treme events are “ambiguous rather than simply uncertain”, and raises concerns about the fu-
ture sustainability of insurance business on natural risks. Failures in capital markets have
been explored by Froot (2001), that found that securitization is not always the lowest-cost
way to transfer risk due to supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections
and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers.
4Losses that the government may incur can be both explicit or implicit: the expenses that
could derive from the reconstruction of public goods and infrastructures or other financial
commitments following a disaster are explicit; on the contrary, expenses that do not reflect
any type of commitment or liability, but which can still occur due to a perceived obligation
are implicit.
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protect the most vulnerable layers of the society and the market, how
can authorities balance public and private initiatives? According to Jaf-
fee and Russell (2013), public initiatives should only complement private
activities and the role that the government should assume depends on
the relationship between objective and subjective probabilities of loss. In
case of perfectly rational individuals with objective perception of risk, an
active role of government is necessary during emergency response only;
if individuals underestimate their risk, investments in public awareness
are needed or, alternatively, mandatory insurance purchase might be in-
troduced. Whether other differences between objective and subjective
probabilities are not generated from behavioural biases, the government
should identify and implement the solution that addresses the specific
market failure in the most efficient way.
Unfortunately, identifying market failures is complicated. To make
matters worse, “with increasing complexity and interaction of human, eco-
nomic and political systems within ecological systems, risk becomes increas-
ingly systemic” (UNDRR, 2019), and responsibilities increasingly blurred.
In increasingly uncertain and complex contexts, cooperation between all
the subjects involved - individuals, businesses, authorities - is essential
to build a community’s resilience (Surminski and Hudson, 2017). It is
therefore important that the Government is able to create and coordinate
a coherent and clear system of actions and responsibilities, which pur-
sues development and well-being goals shared by all stakeholders. To
this end, the public sector should be able to balance its intervention with
the activity of the private sector, in order to protect the stability of both
but at the same time allowing the whole community to achieve an ade-
quate level of protection and security.
Although most countries are still not adequately prepared to deal
with the consequences of possible future disasters5, some have already
implemented a public-private partnership with the insurance sector. Al-
most all these few countries have intervened in the insurance sector, be-
coming insurers, reinsurers or, in the poorest economies, by activating
micro-insurances. Some survey on these partnerships have already been
published, and we refer to those for a more detailed discussion of the
different case studies (e.g. Paudel, 2012; McAneney et al., 2016; Hudson,
Ruiter, et al., 2020). In this review we analyze the Government’s perspec-
5According to the report by Wilkinson et al. (2017), a number of disaster risk manage-
ment activities were conducted during the past decades (most of which were relatively low
cost), but, however, they were not as effective as they could and disaster losses increased
during the Hyogo Framework of Action.
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tive, and we broaden our attention to a wider number of stakeholders,
rather than describing a two-side relationship between the private insur-
ers and the public bodies. The aim of this work is in fact to investigate
how public authorities can build society’s resilience along with the over-
all community by agreeing and designing a set of coherent actions that
(1) protect the well-being of citizens; (2) allow the achievement of the
general development objectives; (3) protect the private sector; (4) do not
unduly weaken public resources.
To this aim, we begin with a brief discussion of the main type of
public-private partnerships currently in force in the next section. The
benefits of these partnerships are widely recognized, but some impor-
tant weaknesses have also emerged. Among these, risk understanding
and government’s attitude toward natural risks are today the two major
limits in disaster risk management, which we discuss in section 2.3. In
section 2.4 we argue that many of these weaknesses can be overcome by
adopting a more inclusive approach - namely a community-based risk
management approach UNDRR (2019) -, which involves a greater num-
ber of stakeholders and therefore allows to monitor the risk on the whole
society. To conclude, section 2.5 discuss the future challenges in disaster
risk management.
2.2 Public-private partnership in insurance
There is a widespread agreement on the benefits of public-private
partnerships for the management of natural disasters (Kunreuther,
2006b; World Bank, 2012b; Shukla et al., 2019) and in particular, public
intervention in the insurance sector is increasingly proving to be effec-
tive, especially in the poorest countries. Government-supported initia-
tives are in fact able to distribute risks and losses over the entire popula-
tion and over time (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006), and are much more
flexible than private solutions as they are not tied to profit objectives
(Penning-Rowsell, 2015). Moreover, they help to strengthen the resilience
of a community by promoting the development of the insurance sector
and allowing faster recovery (Hallegatte and Przyluski, 2010). When in-
surance schemes are properly designed and supported, they communi-
cate risk to the population, foster adaptive responses and risk reduction
and above all improve economic stability and protect the well-being of
the community (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006; Lotze-Campen and Popp,
2012; Hudson, Botzen, et al., 2016; Kunreuther and Lyster, 2016; Kousky,
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Michel-Kerjan, and Raschky, 2018; Linnerooth-Bayer, Surminski, et al.,
2019). As argued by Bruggeman, Faure, and Fiore (2010), however, pub-
lic intervention are beneficial only if they solve a specific market failure
that the private sector is not able to cope with on its own. Otherwise,
the State’s entry into the insurance (or reinsurance) market might play a
distorting effect. Unfortunately, identifying and recognizing the market
failure may not be easy.
Provided that the public intervention is necessary, the effectiveness
of the insurance system depends on a number of conditions. First of
all, it is essential to achieve a satisfactory understanding of the natural
phenomenon and the extent of the losses to which it can lead. In par-
ticular, capturing the spatial correlation that binds insured properties is
fundamental as it challenges the rating process and, in turn, the financial
stability of the system, as happened for example in the U.S. corn insur-
ance market (Woodard et al., 2012). Secondly, the business should be
supported by a coordinated set of actions aimed at overcoming all the
frictions that generate low take up rates, such as lack of trust in the insti-
tution, liquidity constraints, and limited salience among citizens (Cole,
Giné, et al., 2013). Educating the population has often fostered the adop-
tion of policies (Bogale, 2015; Gan, Jarrett, and Gaither, 2014), and in-
come and development support measures proved effective in some cir-
cumstances (Greatrex et al., 2015; McIntosh, Sarris, and Papadopoulos,
2013). If this is not sufficient, mandatory insurance purchase tackles the
root problem (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006), though this solution may not
be well received by citizens. Furthermore, raising awareness of the pop-
ulation on natural disasters in quiet periods is also decisive, as the pro-
longed absence of major events leads to lowered attention and decreases
policy’s purchase (Gan, Jarrett, and Gaither, 2014; Gallagher, 2014).
In this section we present and discuss the three fundamental types of
public-private-partnership in the insurance business - public insurance,
public reinsurance, and micro-insurance -, how governments have im-
plemented them and the difficulties they encountered.
2.2.1 State-owned insurance companies
When a peril has a potential high economic impact in a given area,
insurance companies are concerned about their financial stability and
therefore decide to limit the offer or to provide coverage at an excessively
high price in that area. If the area is large and the number of individuals
and uncovered properties is high, the lack of insurers becomes a huge
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problem for the government as citizens might demand for public inter-
vention in the aftermath of an event. When facing this situation, some
countries reputed offering policies at a price affordable for all citizens
more efficient than deploying capital in ex post relief programs (Kun-
reuther and Pauly, 2006) and have therefore established a state-owned
insurance company. As public companies aim at solving gaps, coverage
is provided for perils that cannot be borne by private companies only. In
fact, most of the schemes deal with a single peril, such as earthquakes in
California or Turkey, or with a restricted set of them. Insurable items are
also limited: coverage is usually provided only for buildings, sometimes
even for vehicles, while other risks, such as business interruptions, are
rarely covered.
Table 1 describes the main public insurance against natural disasters
currently in place. Most of these companies were born out of heated de-
bate between insurers operating in the area and the national authorities
and are supported by both. Sometimes the role of the private sector is
limited to technical advice during the creation of the public program and
to data provision, other times the public company shares the risks with
the private ones through co-insurance. Furthermore, private companies
almost always act as intermediaries between citizens and the public com-
pany by underwriting policies and transferring risks and the related pre-
miums to the state-owned entity in exchange for a fee. Governments typ-
ically support the public company by assuming the role of guarantor in
exchange of a charge (e.g. EQC in New Zealand) or for free (e.g. Consor-
cio de Compensacion de Seguros in Spain). Alternatively, governments
may provide a prearranged facilitated access to credit, as in the case of
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). In addition, State-owned
companies may also benefit of contingent credit lines from international
organizations such as the World Bank.
Since the main purpose of government pools is to give the chance
to most of the population to get insured, the policies are sold at a low
price or at least at a premium lower than that offered by private com-
panies. The main reason why public insurance companies may charge
lower rates is that, unlike private companies, they do not have to dis-
tribute profits. However, this choice has some important drawbacks.
First, the low premiums of the public insurer can compete with the few
private companies that have decided to offer the policy, generating a
crowding out effect and weakening the private sector (McAneney et al.,
2016). Second, if low rates are not actuarially sound, they expose public
insurers to a risk of reserve depleting higher than that legally allowed
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to traditional insurers. Furthermore, in a competitive market, the trans-
action and administration costs that public companies have to bear can
be even higher than those of the corresponding private companies (Mar-
shall, 2018; Michel-Kerjan, 2010). In addition, governments often apply
flat premium rates that include subsidy among individuals but fail to cre-
ate risk-reflecting reserves. Low rates therefore make government guar-
antees or other forms of public financial support necessary to the suste-
nance of the program but, in order to limit public capital injections, the
pool should ideally become self-sustained at a certain time. To this aim,
governments can reduce the risk beared by the company by encourag-
ing and committing communities to risk mitigation (Kunreuther, 2006a;
Kunreuther, 2015). Building codes and premium discounts for proper-
ties subjected to structural strengthening interventions have been exten-
sively adopted, albeit with varying results. The risk reduction is in fact
largely demanded to citizens, who may consider the investment not ad-
vantageous (Kleindorfer, Grossi, and Kunreuther, 2005), and therefore
countries that have applied more binding risk mitigation plans have ob-
tained greater participation.
Some comparative analysis on Switzerland and Germany have
shown that establishing a public insurance monopoly can significantly
increase the system’s self-sustainability. In fact, monopoly lowers the
transactional and administrative expenses by eliminating the need for
insurance brokers and agents and allowing the company to keep a rather
simpler service. At the same time, it encourages the company to invest
in risk reduction not just in terms of the amount of expenditure, but by
promoting a more effective planning too (Ungern-Sternberg, 2001; Kirch-
gaessner, 2007). Unfortunately, the establishment of insurance monopo-
lies is severely hampered by the private sector and by some constraints
in current legislation (e.g. the EU bans these monopolies, and Germany
was forced to dissolve its one in 1994).
The company’s financial exposure can then be reduced by applying
deductibles to the policies or transferring the risks through reinsurance.
Both components are important: the former preserves a certain degree of
citizens’ responsibility; the latter allows the State-owned company to get
rid of the higher losses by transferring them to specialized bodies or on
international markets, so as not to unduly affect the insurance reserves
and public resources following a catastrophic event (OECD, 2018b). In
particular, as risks evolve rapidly and disasters become more and more
frequent, reinsurance is essential for public companies to survive (Seo,
2004).
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Although all the schemes in Table 1 are profoundly different from
each other, any of them requires four elements to properly function:
strong government financial support, a great commitment to risk reduc-
tion, high citizen participation and ongoing access to the reinsurance
market. Since State-owned insurances are just a few and some of them
are extremely young, it is difficult to outline how to properly balance
the four components. However, the history of NFIP, which is one of the
oldest and most studied public insurance programs, has shown how de-
cisive these components are.6
Voluntary citizen participation is the most common issue in natural
disaster insurance, and, despite favorable cost, most State-owned insur-
ances record low take up rates also. Undesired consequences of low
insurance penetration are potentially high costs of government’s post-
disaster assistance (Dixon et al., 2006), and reduced access to the rein-
surance market for the insurer (von Lucius, 2004). There are several rea-
sons why the population exhibits careless behavior towards natural dis-
asters’ prevention, but state-owned insurances seem particularly affected
6NFIP is a public insurance program for flooding in the U.S. and provides policies only
if the community joined a floodplains laws and ordinances program. The program applies
risk-based premiums (although some subsidy was introduced in 2014 with the Homeown-
ers Flood Insurance Affordability Act) defined on the flood maps. In order to better capture
the real risk of the different areas, the government committed to update and complete the
flood risk maps. The program has been hardly criticized because rates did not provide
the necessary income to build long-term reserves (US General Accounting Office, 2001)
and flood mapping process was not so effective and timely as planned (Kousky and Kun-
reuther, 2014). In addition, NFIP was not authorized to secure private reinsurance until
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 and the Homeowners Flood In-
surance Affordability Act of 2014. Although rates have been updated several times, the
program reached the statutory borrowing cap from the Treasury in September 2017. The
U.S. Congress cancelled more than half of the debt, but NFIP had to borrow additional
capital two months later. The company’s outstanding debt is currently $20.5 billion and is
likely to grow as its annual probable maximum loss is over $40 billion and its capacity to
pay claims without borrowing is $5.4 billion (FEMA, 2020). As extreme rainfall along the
Gulf Coast are on the rise (Oldenborgh et al., 2017), it therefore seems very unlikely that
the program will be able to resist without the strong support of the State. Moreover, unless
reauthorized or amended by the Congress, the NFIP’s borrowing limit from the Treasury
will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion at the end of September 2020. Although
late access to reinsurance and low premiums have certainly played a role in the NFIP’s
debt accumulation, part of the financial weakness of the program is due to the insufficient
participation of the communities. In general, individuals have not invested enough in risk
mitigation and the government has not been able to identify the right stimuli. A more
frequent remapping and the consequent adjustment of the premiums could have helped
to spread awareness and encourage private investments (Michel-Kerjan, 2010; Kousky and
Kunreuther, 2014). Along with insufficient risk mitigation, NFIP has also recorded low take
up rates (Dixon et al., 2006).
15
by charity hazard (Gurenko et al., 2006; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann,
2007; Başbuğ-Erkan and Yilmaz, 2015; Marshall, 2018). The belief that
the government will help irrespective of owning an insurance policy is
stronger when governmental relief is more certain (Raschky, Schwarze,
et al., 2013), and States offering a public-private insurance have usually
been very generous to the community when hit by a disaster. Along
with charity hazard, low risk perception and poor policy understanding
are also quite frequent (Chivers and Flores, 2002). Introducing manda-
tory insurance purchase can rise take up rates (Kunreuther and Pauly,
2006; Kriesel and Landry, 2004), provided that the obligation is properly
formulated and monitored (Dixon et al., 2006). For example, in Turkey,
property-owners are required to prove to have valid policy only when
they want to buy or sell a house or to obtain a new account for water
and electricity services. As argued by Başbuğ-Erkan and Yilmaz (2015),
this sporadic check does not enforce ongoing renewal of the insurance.
The Turkish government has therefore activated some initiatives aimed
at promoting awareness, many of which have been designed so that the
most sensitive citizens involve an increasing number of acquaintances.
For example, a 20 percent premium discount is offered if eight individ-
ual apartment unit owners from the same apartment complex jointly take
out a policy, and is supporting the growth of a large volunteer and civil
society network (Başbuğ-Erkan and Yilmaz, 2015; World Bank, 2019).
As frequent monitoring mandatory requirement might be expensive, ex-
tending the policy validity to multi-years might also help (Michel-Kerjan,
Forges, and Kunreuther, 2011; Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and Ou-Yang,
2012).
Along with scarce participation of the citizens, State-owned compa-
nies should also deal with all the problems traditionally affecting insur-
ers. First of all, adequate risk assessment might be extremely challeng-
ing where historic losses are not available. An insurance scheme might
be hence designed based on simulation techniques, as in the case of
the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (Linnerooth-Bayer, Mechler, and
Hochrainer-Stigler, 2011), but this brings additional uncertainty to the
estimates (Başbuğ-Erkan and Yilmaz, 2015; Cakti, Erdik, and Sesetyan,
2006). The sensitivity of the cost of reimbursements to changes in market
prices or the reconstruction of homes should also be considered when
constructing reserves. For example, in New Zealand, the State-owned
insurance EQC operates in co-insurance with the private sector and pays
its reimbursement quota to the insured along with the traditional insurer.
After the Christchurch earthquake sequence in 2011, different private
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companies met their obligation at different times (some even took more
than 5 years) and, since the reimbursement provided by EQC is equal to
the cost of rebuilding the home, the cost of the event on the company’s
reserves was strongly affected by the market price variation of both con-
struction works and materials (Wood, Noy, and Parker, 2016).
2.2.2 Public reinsurance companies
Some countries faced great natural risks with an underdeveloped
insurance industry that was not solid enough to manage the potential
losses of the entire population. In order to strengthen the private insur-
ance sector and foster its growth, a few governments established a State-
administered reinsurance company to which insurers can or must trans-
fer natural risks (some examples are reported in Table 2). Like public
insurance, governments often ease the financial pressure of public rein-
surer by assuming some layer of risk - e.g. as a guarantor of last resort.
However, compared to providing a State guarantee to insurers, this strat-
egy preserves individual responsibilities and requires the participation
of all individuals who contribute to the creation of the financial expo-
sure as the cost of reinsurance is charged on the final price of the policy
(Bruggeman, Faure, and Fiore, 2010).
The characteristics and problems of public reinsurance are very sim-
ilar to those of State-owned insurances. First, the premium paid for
reinsurance is typically low because the authorities want the insurers
to keep citizens’ premiums low. However, in this case, this solution is
disproportionately beneficial for private insurers which are free to apply
the rating mechanism they want. For this reason, some government-
reinsurers fixed the property-owners’ premiums by legislative decree
and/or obliged insurers to offer the policy. In particular, policies for nat-
ural disasters are often compulsorily included in other basic policies, the
purchase of which may be mandatory for property-owners. In general,
this has led to satisfactorily high insurance penetration rates, and thus
outperforming public insurers in terms of take up rates. On the other
side, low reinsurance premiums may also challenge the company’s finan-
cial stability, as happened to the French Casse Centrale de Reassurance
(CCR) in 1999.7
7In France, the publicly owned reinsurance company Casse Centrale de Reassurance
(CCR) hit bankruptcy in 1999 due to too low fees and too much confidence in the unlimited
State guarantee (Vallet, 2004; Bruggeman, Faure, and Fiore, 2010). Measures were then
taken which changed the conditions of the subscription. There is also concern for the young
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In order to ease financial pressure, governments often include risk
mitigation in the State’s risk management plan, although the measures
envisaged have not always been effective. In addition to the difficulties
in incentivising private investments in risk reduction, the government’s
management objectives strongly hindered risk reduction in many coun-
tries. In France, for example, when the mandatory insurance require-
ment came into force and the CCR was instituted, the flood risk mitiga-
tion measures required clashed with the growth interests of the local au-
thorities and consequently were not implemented properly (Vallet, 2004).
In the UK, instead, the government does not seem to actually encourage
risk reduction despite it signed its commitment in the agreement with
the insurers (Surminski and Eldridge, 2014; Penning-Rowsell, 2015; Sur-
minski, 2018). In Florida, the Florida Catastrophe Insurance Fund was
launched to encourage urban growth but, according to Seo (2004), this in-
creased the risk exposure over time, powered by climate change. In 2009,
to decrease exposure, the government has hence activated a program for
gradual privatisation of its risk, which also introduced the adoption of
retrocession lines and insurance-linked securities (ILS). In this respect,
retrocession is proving increasingly important to ensure the continuity
of public reinsurance due to climate change and the slow progress in
risk mitigation.
To date, the strength of probably the most stable public reinsurance
system in place, the Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Co., is due to a com-
bination of all the revised elements: an adequate risk preparedness and
mitigation, a strong political leadership, a structured risk retrocession
plan, and the simplicity of the policies that has favored adoption by citi-
zens (Takeda, 2004).
2.2.3 Micro-insurance
In the poorest countries, natural disasters generate far more com-
plex social issues than in developed ones, such as malnutrition, school
dropouts, increased poverty. Moreover, the risk of natural disasters can
slow down the development of these countries, as farmers are more re-
luctant to invest in new cultivation techniques that can potentially boost
productivity in the long run but might generate greater loss in case of a
disaster (World Bank, 2014). In these contexts, insurance can help safe-
Flood Re in the UK, which seems to generate strong pressure on public finances (Surminski,
2018).
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guarding productivity and, potentially, economic growth. However, the
poorest have hardly access to risk transfer.
The reasons for the low (or absent) penetration of insurance markets
in this segment of the population are manifold and are only partially re-
lated to the supply side. In fact, if on the one hand the insurers often fail
to assess the risk in these territories due to the lack of historical data, on
the other the individuals are very reluctant to purchase. Several stud-
ies on African and Asian regions have in fact brought to light a strong
distrust of population towards the companies that offer insurance or the
institutions that support them (Cole, Bastian, et al., 2012; Greatrex et al.,
2015).
In this complex context, international organizations, especially the
World Bank, and local or national governments have begun to adopt
several form of micro-insurance, especially index-based insurance. An
index-based (or index-linked) insurance is an insurance policy whose
payout is triggered by an easily-measured event, represented through
an index, typically concerning weather conditions (e.g. rainfall below a
certain level). Index-based insurance are usually applied to agricultural
risks and many initiatives have been activated by local governments in
several regions of Africa and Asia. A great advantage of these tools is
that they do not need information on individual losses, but only weather
or environmental data which are more easily available and less expen-
sive to monitor. For the same reason, the compensation mechanism is
far more transparent, thus preventing moral hazard and facilitating the
access to reinsurance market for the insurer (Alderman and Haque, 2007;
Cole, Bastian, et al., 2012).
The main issue related to index-linked insurance is basis risk: it is
possible that an individual receives a payment when he has not suffered
losses or that he does not receive it against a large loss. In this regard,
various solutions for fine tuning indexes have been proposed in the liter-
ature, the main ones being the use of early warnings and seasonal fore-
casting in the payout triggering mechanism and the definition of com-
plex indices incorporating multiple climatic measurements and built on
a better geographical granularity (Rao, 2010; Daron and Stainforth, 2014;
Dercon et al., 2014; Conradt, Finger, and Spörri, 2015). Another unfa-
vorable drawback generated by basis risk is that it reduces consumer
demand for insurance.
On the demand side, however, frictions are related to non-economic
factors, including levels of financial literacy, liquidity, distrust (Cole, Bas-
tian, et al., 2012; Eling, Pradhan, and Schmit, 2014; Bogale, 2015; Greatrex
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et al., 2015). Cole, Bastian, et al. (2012) found a positive effect of involv-
ing non-governmental organisations on take up rates, though the impact
differs depending on their reputation. The organisation staff might help
overcoming distrust and spreading knowledge of the products. Invest-
ing in financial literacy and training courses is also highly recommended
(Cole, Bastian, et al., 2012; World Bank, 2005), though empirical evidence
is confusing (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Cole, Bastian, et al., 2012; Bo-
gale, 2015).
In addition to the difficulties in defining the instruments and the poor
grip on the demand, other factors challenge the future of index-linked
securities. First, many of these initiatives are supported by the authori-
ties through vouchers or remittances and this support is essential to al-
low the establishment of the insurance scheme. However, if the system
fails to develop properly and does not become profitable to the provider,
it is likely that the insurer will stop offering the policy (Alderman and
Haque, 2007). Further uncertainties concern the future affordability of
the policies. Siebert (2016) notes in fact that the premiums in the Sahel re-
gion are extremely sensitive to the climatic parameters of the model and
this could lead to a considerable increase in prices in high-risk areas -
an increasingly likely scenario, given the strong effects of climate change
on weather events. Hence, in order for micro-insurance to continue, an
effort from the public sector is still needed (Cole, 2015). Governments
will have both to invest in facilitating access to risk transfer to the poor-
est, and to incentivize companies to keep offering policies and innovate
index-linked insurances.
2.3 Failures
Some theoretical study show that public-private partnerships are able
to offer a more efficient level of natural-catastrophe insurance than free
markets (Burby, 2001; Charpentier and Le Maux, 2014) but a series of
deficit characterizes the history of government pools. In this respect,
McAneney et al. (2016) argues that “Government pools usually contain an
inherent contradiction in trying to provide low cost insurance to high-risk prop-
erties and so the funding of deficits to which they are inevitably prone becomes
important”. Fat-tails and spatial correlation make aggregate losses ex-
tremely volatile and also contribute to insolvencies (Kousky and Cooke,
2009; Kousky and Cooke, 2012). Moreover, most of the government sup-
ported insurance apply flat premium rates that do not reflect the asset’s
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riskiness. This choice may be motivated by economic arguments (Hal-
legatte, 2011), but might fail to provide the necessary income to build
long-term reserves.
Public-private insurers can in principle minimise losses by encourag-
ing risk mitigation (Kunreuther, 2006a; Kunreuther, 2015), but little evi-
dence about this can be found in practice. In particular, insurance com-
panies try to encourage risk mitigation by offering discounted policies.
However, in order for this initiative to be successful, insurers must have
the opportunity to apply risk-based premiums (Kunreuther, 2015) or, if
the government demands a form of subsidy in the rating, the author-
ities must actively engage in risk mitigation, for example by outlining
well-enforced building codes that force property owners to adopt cost-
effective protective mechanisms (Kunreuther, 2003). However, defining
effective rules on construction and policy purchase and enforcing them
has often proved practically difficult and not always in line with the
other management objectives of the local authorities.
Alternatively, strengthening the business by adopting new forms of
reinsurance coverage can protect insurers against potential insolvency
from disasters too (Kunreuther, 1996; Lee and Yu, 2007) and for this rea-
son the ILS market has significantly grown in the last decades (Cummins,
2007; Cummins, 2008; Cummins and Barrieu, 2012). Despite this, the ILS
market is still relatively young and countries are often reluctant to adopt
these securities because they usually lack experts who can oversee their
construction and issuance (OECD, 2010; Michel-Kerjan, Zelenko, et al.,
2011).8 In addition to lack of technical knowledge, the development of
the ILS market could also be hindered by the crowding out effect9 that
governments involved in the free market exert on more efficient private
reinsurance solutions (Cummins, 2006).
According to UNDRR (2019), to date countries have “patchy” imple-
mented their risk management strategies. Most are addressing the con-
sequences of disasters rather than trying to reduce their actual risk. The
great weaknesses of the national strategies currently in place and the rea-
sons that led to a too slow development of proactive strategies at the na-
8In order to incentivize the adoption of catastrophe-bonds, in 2009 the World Bank has
launched the MultiCat program, in which it offers its technical support and act as an ar-
ranger. In the same year, Mexico benefited from the program and issued a US$290 million
cat bond with a three-year maturity (World Bank, 2013).
9The crowding out effect of public programs refers to all those situations in which
government-supported initiatives meant to cover the uninsured prompt those already en-
rolled in private insurance to switch to the public program.
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tional level can all be traced back to two major problems: insufficient risk
understanding and weak governance (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019).
2.3.1 Risk understanding
The effectiveness of risk management policies strongly depends on
the ability to identify and assess the risks (UNISDR, 2017). Knowing the
probability of occurrence of the events and their potential impacts10 con-
stitutes the basis for developing and evaluating the whole range of risk
management strategies, such as emergency plans or cost-benefit analy-
sis11 of risk reduction measures. It also allows the decision-making pro-
cess to develop skills to be adapted to local risk profiles and the social
conditions of the communities involved, promoting awareness of po-
tential risks among the society. A well-established collection of data on
risks, exposures, vulnerabilities and expected losses is fundamental for
the success of any risk management strategy (Kunreuther, 2003).
Both the Hyogo and the Sendai Frameworks have underlined the im-
portance of risk understanding and, in turn, of data collection and risk
assessment. Since then, substantial progress was made, but, neverthe-
less, major gaps still affect many countries (UNISDR, 2017). In particular,
UNDRR (2019) identifies four challenges about data on risks: availability,
quality, accessibility and application. Availability concerns data collec-
tion, a necessary step for risk assessment. Understanding natural risks
requires an enormous amount of information that are costly to collect
and, in addition, natural disasters are rare events and therefore creating
a database requires time, at least decades. Along with long times of ob-
servation, high-quality data is necessary to guarantee effective analysis.
Insurers and reinsurers are among the major data producers in the world
in terms of both dimensions and quality of their databases, but they are
10When assessing natural risk a variety of impacts should be considered on different
groups across the society. Impacts might be direct or indirect, as shown by World Bank
(2014) for the government, homeowners, farmers and the poorest.
11As argued by Field et al. (2012), use and applicability of cost-benefit analysis to risk
reduction measures are constrained by important limitations, that Mechler (2016) summa-
rizes in: (i) representing disaster risk, (ii) assessing intangibles and indirect benefits, (iii)
assessing portfolios of systemic interventions versus single interventions, (iv) the role of
spatial and temporal scales. Despite these limitations, the author argues that cost–benefit
analysis remains an important tool for prioritizing efficient disaster risk measures and is
well suited for the evaluation of infrastructure-based options. By contrast, preparedness
and systemic interventions can be better evaluated by means of other tools such as cost-
effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis and robust decision-making approaches.
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usually not keen to share their database. Data accessibility strongly lim-
its the analysis of natural riskiness and is not confined to private entities
as several countries show difficulties in data-sharing among government
institutions. However, accessing to a high-quality database is not suffi-
cient for accurate analysis: data should in fact fit the purpose of the study.
Data analysis is by far more problematic than data collection. As risk
is determined by a combination of hazard, exposure and vulnerability,
any change in the society, landscapes, or technology might completely
reshape the area’s risk profile. As a consequence, past events might no
more be representative of the area and this challenges the possibility of
projecting the future from the past, or at the least, that classical statis-
tical techniques can be used. To overcome these problems, a new ap-
proach to risk assessment, called “catastrophe-modeling”, has been de-
veloped.12 Catastrophe models are software that combine geological, en-
gineering, IT and statistical knowledge to simulate the effects of natural
events on the territory.13 These sophisticated tools are widely adopted by
the insurance industry and are increasingly used by governments also.14
These software require continuous updating and their developers are
constantly striving to achieve ever more accurate predictions of losses.
To date, there are models capable of describing almost all natural risks,
but some important eventualities are not yet satisfactorily represented,
12Catastrophe-modelling began in the 1960s, but its adoption is much more recent. The
first commercially produced model dates back to twenty years later. When introduced,
their use was not widespread. They became increasingly popular in the insurance industry
from 1989, when Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta Earthquake caused severe losses
to US insurers, and then Hurricane Andrew in 1992, that led nine insurers to insolvency,
furthermore incentivized their adoption (Grossi, Kunreuther, and Windeler, 2005). Since
the early beginning, insurance industry has been the most important driver of their de-
velopment. From the 2000s developers have started including insurance pricing in the
models, and actuarial standards and guidelines for the use of catastrophe modelling have
been published by the actuarial society of both Europe and the US (Mitchell-Wallace et al.,
2017).
13Note that, despite these models simulate the impacts of natural disasters to overcome
lack of data, historical records are still necessary and serve as input for the simulation
process.
14The first country in investing in catastrophe-modelling was the US. In 1997 FEMA pro-
duced HAZUS, a catastrophe-model to estimate earthquake losses in the Country. The
model has later been extended to floods and hurricanes. More recently, around the 2010’s,
there has been a large-scale revision of the existing catastrophe-models and new ones
emerged. Some of these have been produced by governmental organizations, like for ex-
ample, R-FONDEN in 2007, created through a partnership between the Mexican Natural
Disasters Fund (FONDEN) and the Ministry of Finance with the technical support of the In-
stitute of Engineering of the UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) (World
Bank, 2012a).
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including cascading effects, multi-hazard analysis, spatial correlation be-
tween assets exposed (Mitchell-Wallace et al., 2017). Furthermore, these
models are tied to the characteristics of the areas on which they are built
and might not represent regions that are too different from the reference
area.
2.3.2 Governance
Currently most countries are addressing the consequences of disas-
ters rather than trying to reduce their actual risk (Opitz-Stapleton et al.,
2019; UNDRR, 2019). This purely “corrective” attitude15 is the main
weakness of disaster risk management strategies, which should instead
define a plan of interventions aimed at building the skills necessary for
the community to face adverse events or to limit them. However, devel-
oping “progressive” disaster risk management is much more complex
than just dealing with consequences. First of all, managers should move
from a single-threat to a multi-threat perspective, recognize the existence
of multiple sources of risk, potentially correlated, and prepare to face all
of them (UNDRR, 2019). Secondly, the manager must prepare a plan of
interventions that should be effective in the long run. For example, in
the case of risk mitigation interventions, this means not only to fund the
initial investment, but also to provide for all maintenance activities that
will guarantee its future functioning. Finally, it is essential that the risk
management strategy is included into a broader management plan, so
that consistency between the actions of the various governmental offices
will be guaranteed. For example, it urban development plans should not
provide for settlements expansion in high-risk areas (Rozenberg and Fay,
2019).
This approach is much broader and much more expensive in terms
of both time and cost than simply fixing the consequences. In addi-
tion to the difficulty of planning, other factors negatively influence man-
agers’ choices. Studies on the relationship between natural disasters and
election suggest that it may not be convenient for a government to in-
vest in disaster reduction. In fact, if on the one hand the population
tends to blame the government for natural disasters (Achen and Bartels,
2004), on the other hand politicians are discouraged to invest in risk mit-
15According to Twigg (2015), corrective risk management are project-oriented strategies
composed by measures that address specific current risks only. As opposed to the correc-
tive strategy, the progressive disaster risk management is process-oriented and builds a
range of capacities to cope with future threats, both anticipated and unforeseen.
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igation because electorate has short memory and benefits from the in-
tervention may take years and may even appear once the ruling party
has changed (Cavallo and Noy, 2009). In addition, Healy and Malhotra
(2009) found evidence that voters reward presidential party for disaster
relief but not for investing in disaster preparedness. This might explain
why governments appear so generous in spending on disaster relief dur-
ing the election (Cole, Healy, and Werker, 2012). Along with political
pressure, decision-makers might fail to recognize the importance of haz-
ards and vulnerability to national development, might be excessively
risk-prone or reluctant to allocate substantial resources for events that
might not even happen (Michel-Kerjan and Slovic, 2010; Opitz-Stapleton
et al., 2019).
2.4 Toward a community-based risk manage-
ment approach
As countries slowly revise their plans, risk evolves quickly: the sheer
number of people on Earth, climate change and the dynamic connect-
edness of biological and physical worlds are making natural risks in-
creasingly systemic. Since risk is the result of individuals and collec-
tive decisions, the United Nations warn that, as risk gets more and
more complex, responsibilities cannot be clearly assigned to the differ-
ent stakeholders. Governments are able to influence risk-generating or
risk-reducing behavior in the population, in the private, public and vol-
untary sectors through public policies, hence UNDRR (2019) argues that
“by incentivizing transdisciplinary, integrated, multisectoral research engaging
non-traditional counterparts, risk assessment and decision-making efficiency
can be improved, duplication of effort reduced, and connected collective action
facilitated. National planning bodies with representation from all sectors must
develop risk reduction strategies that assume an “all-of-State” institutions ap-
proach to risk reduction”.
The United Nations encourage countries to establish solid partner-
ships both with private stakeholders and between governments, but,
though necessary, they can also be difficult to manage. In particular, a
United Nations survey on public-private partnerships for natural risk
management UNISDR (2008) revealed that an active participation of all
the community at risk is fundamental for the effectiveness of a strategy,
but it can be achieved only if the government is able to create the proper
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conditions. First of all, arousing the interest of the private sector is nec-
essary, as firms will participate in the initiatives only if they deem them
convenient, and maintain their commitment over time. Since a plurality
of private subjects make up the community, disaster risk management
should be mutually beneficial and local authorities must encourage ac-
tive and productive dialogue among the subjects involved (for example,
between insurance and academia). In order to involve private compa-
nies, the government can ask them to develop a project and make them
responsible for the parts that compete with them. Furthermore, the role
of individual citizens, who can make an important contribution if prop-
erly informed and involved, should not be overlooked. In fact, educating
the right segment of the population can encourage risk reduction behav-
iors, and fosters the dialogue between individuals and authorities. It is
also important that citizens believe in the risk management strategy, so
that they will actively engage in safety and involve more and more peo-
ple. Trust between institutions and partners is essential for the success
of the strategy and it is the duty of the government to constantly nourish
it (for example by punishing the fraudulent companies that offer indi-
viduals risk reduction goods or services at excessively high prices), but
constant monitoring private partners is also crucial.
A “community-based disaster risk management”16 raises the voice of
people that are hence able to better communicate vulnerabilities to the
governor, thus allowing for a more comprehensive view of risk. Un-
derstanding the social context is in fact essential for the construction of
effective measures, and it is particularly important to reach out the weak-
est segments of the population.17 In particular, Twigg (2015) claims that
“participatory risk reduction initiatives are more sustainable because they build
16World Health Organization (2015) defines a community as “a group of people living in
the same environment, sharing the same livelihood. [...]. Community members are the immediate
victims of the adverse effects of disasters and they have the best knowledge about their local sur-
roundings such as demographic, social, economic, and cultural status, risky areas, water sources,
roads and health facilities. In addition, community members have information about the vulnerable
groups [...] and can assist health care”. Community-based disaster risk management empow-
ers the community, address the root causes of risks and address it through local knowledge
and expertise and for this reason activities and actions vary from one community to another
(Heijmans, 2009).
17Some studies have shown that the poorests are more vulnerable to natural disasters due
to their limited ability to cope with disasters (Hallegatte, Vogt-Schilb, et al., 2017). As the
impact of natural disaster on well-being might also be tremendous, other factors impacting
vulnerability are inequalities concerning gender, age, education, ethnicity, wealth, health
status, disability, access to resources and environmental concerns (Hallegatte, Rentschler,
and Walsh, 2018; Shukla et al., 2019).
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on local capacity, ideas can be tested and refined before adoption, and they are
more likely to be compatible with long-term development plans. They may also
be more cost-effective in the long term than externally-driven initiatives”. Un-
fortunately, in Twigg (2011), the author argues that reality diverges from
the desirable scenario of trust, collaboration and dialogue.
In addition, developing countries could enormously benefit from col-
laborations between national governments and international institutions
such as the World Bank, which for their part are interested in promoting
risk reduction to contain future expenses (Kunreuther, 2003). Most re-
gions with high exposure to natural hazards are involved in projects with
intergovernmental organizations coordinating the disaster risk manage-
ment (UNDRR, 2019), though some advancement is still needed. On
the negative side, sometimes a lack of trust has hindered collabora-
tive preparedness effort in conjunction with international aid agencies
(Twigg, 2015), and collaboration between national governments should
be strengthened.
2.5 Final remarks and future challenghes
In 2015, the United Nations declared that natural hazards could erase
decades of progress (United Nations General Assembly, 2015), but de-
velopment itself fosters natural hazards. In fact, unsustainable develop-
ment leads to an increase in social inequalities and in the number of poor
who, because of their limited resources, constitute the most vulnerable
and least resilient segment of the population. In turn, inequalities create
social and political exclusion, and since the participation of the whole
community is necessary for risk understanding, this poses a further ob-
stacle to the effectiveness of the managers’ choices (UNDRR, 2019).
Especially in the poorest countries, development went along with
rapid urbanization, which has strong impacts on risks. Cities are in fact
extremely dangerous due to biological, chemical, physical, and socio-
political conditions. In addition, they host large numbers of low-income
people who live in low-quality facilities, sometimes without access to ad-
equate infrastructure. The urbanization process, often carried out in an
uncontrolled way, has therefore brought together a large number of ex-
tremely vulnerable people in highly risky areas (Dickson et al., 2012). In
this respect, Hallegatte, Vogt-Schilb, et al. (2017) registered a global trend
toward increased risk taking: “from 1970 to 2010 the world population grew
by 87 percent, while the population in flood plains increased by 114 percent and
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in cyclone-prone coastlines by 192 percent”. The situation aggravates when
appropriate building codes are lacking.
Further consequences of urbanization are damage to the ecosystem
and deforestation, which can cause the emergence of new natural phe-
nomena, such as the spread of new diseases (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019).
Climate change runs faster every year and its consequences are more
and more tangible all over the world. According to Geneva Association
(2013) and Geneva Association (2018), the changing climate is challeng-
ing the weather-relater branches of the insurance industry. State-owned
insurance and reinsurance companies are particularly fragile since, being
bound by subsidy rules and government choices, are less flexible than
private ones and will not be able to adapt their prices quickly (Penning-
Rowsell, 2015; Olcina et al., 2016; Oldenborgh et al., 2017). According to
Hallegatte, Bangalore, et al. (2016), climate change could drag up to 100
million people into poverty by 2030, but the financing needs for adap-
tation in developing countries far exceed funds available (World Bank,
2010). Country’s reluctance in investing in adaptation is largely due
to the uncertainty surrounding the projects’ benefits and, in addition,
government undertaking some project may not be well-rewarded by the
population, whose support or opposition is determined by the percep-
tion of danger associated to climate change or to the use of current tech-
nologies (Kunreuther, Gupta, et al., 2014). A first step that governments
can take toward building a more climate-resilient society is encouraging
or forcing private initiatives through adequate spatial planning frame-
works, infrastructure projects and policy appraisals, regulatory and eco-
nomic standards (OECD, 2018a). Public-private partnerships can chan-
nel and coordinate the efforts and objectives of governments and mul-
tiple private entities - project companies, lenders, shareholders, insurers
and professional advisors - provided that tasks and responsibilities are
clearly assigned (World Bank, 2016). In order for the plan to be effective,
governments should ensure consistency with the other policies adopted
which could otherwise distort the climate-resilient incentives and dis-
courage the adoption of the desired solutions (OECD, 2018a). As ar-
gued by the Hallegatte, Bangalore, et al. (2016), we hence need to rapidly
switch to inclusive climate-informed development.
In light of this, it is increasingly evident that the management of nat-
ural risks cannot be effectively achieved unless included in a sustainable
development plan. UNDRR (2019) warns that “with increasing complexity
and interaction of human, economic and political systems within ecological sys-
tems, risk becomes increasingly systemic. [...]. The way in which such changes –
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including in the intensity and frequency of hazards – affect human activity is yet
difficult to foresee. Current approaches to risk measurement and management
are inadequate to meet the challenges of the multifaceted interconnectedness of
hazard, the barely understood breadth of exposure, and the profound detail of
vulnerability”.
A “development-enhancing risk-management” includes risk reduc-
tion in the development plans, allowing to define a set of coherent ac-
tions and thus avoiding those conflicts of interest that have led to a scarce
commitment of local authorities in risk mitigation. Furthermore, it takes
into account all the externalities of a risk reduction measure, some of
which may not concern natural risks (Clarke and Doherty, 2004; Kun-
reuther, 2006b; OECD, 2018a). A first step in embracing this comprehen-
sive approach might be incorporating risk reduction measures into exist-
ing funding streams (Twigg, 2015), for example by activating a coupled
loan and voucher program for homeowners to relocate out of risk-prone
areas (Kousky and Kunreuther, 2014). governments might also prevent
risk creation and foster mitigation by setting appropriate development-
related standards and regulations, policies on social protection and pay-
ment for ecosystem services.
Although it is recognized that a large part of the capital for risk miti-
gation works cannot but come from the public sector (Paudel, 2012), even
large companies have the financial capacity to bear the costs of some in-
frastructural interventions. A public-private partnership can encourage
investments by financially strong private stakeholders. For example, a
government that enters into an agreement with local insurance compa-
nies by offering adequate guarantees for the highest levels of loss with-
out completely relieving them of the risk assumed, can create the ideal
conditions for the insurance companies to invest in structural works that
further lower the local level of risk. In this sense, a partnership between
the government and several insurers, can facilitate agreement between
the insurers to co-financing these works, so that the cost for each com-
pany is lowered while benefits are kept constant. In addition, govern-
ments that provide a facilitated guarantee to insurance companies can
request a fee, which can be re-invested in risk mitigation, thus slightly
lowering the pressure on public accounts and the need for public ad-hoc
post-disaster relief.
In order for the investment in risk mitigation to be profitable in terms
of cost-benefits for an insurance Company, it is essential that the insurer
has a solid and broad policyholder base (Hudson, Ruiter, et al., 2020;
Paudel, 2012). The government can therefore encourage its construction
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by introducing a strict mandatory requirement, for example by requiring
the coverage for natural disasters be included in the general basic policy.
In addition, a good incentive for citizens to buy policies can be provided
by banks, which often require those who take out mortgages to insure
the property purchased.
In addition to large public or private investments for the community,
strengthening interventions on private homes are also advisable and,
overall, can have an important effect in reducing the impacts of natu-
ral disasters. To this end, evidence was gathered that risk-based premi-
ums with discounts for risk mitigation can stimulate private initiative
(Surminski and Hudson, 2017). In order for these premiums to remain
affordable even in the most at-risk locations and for the less wealthy cit-
izens, the government can provide special vouchers to these categories.
A further advantage of a public-private partnership with a high num-
ber of stakeholders is that a nationally representative body can coordi-
nate the actions of all, avoiding development choices by local authorities
as well as risk fostering actions that conflict with risk management objec-
tives. Furthermore, this body can verify that all types of natural hazards
are addressed and that development choices take into account the needs
of all stakeholders and are always aimed at maximizing collective well-
being. The increased involvement of the community can help the coordi-
nating authority in identifying the critical issues to be managed and the
factors to be considered in management choices thanks to a better and
more inclusive risk assessment.
Investments in risk mitigation are essential for the partnership to be
sustainable for the public sector, whose resources often run out quickly
due to recovery. However, risk mitigation is not sufficient and a large
contribution to the stability of the system should come from a number
of financial instruments. Among these, traditional reinsurance, ILS, or
state-contingent debt instruments can help dealing with the post-disaster
phase, while green bonds can foster climate change adaptation (Opitz-
Stapleton et al., 2019). The high complexity of these tools has often con-
stituted an important barrier to their adoption but, thanks to a partner-
ship with insurance and financial institutions, the government would be
able to receive adequate technical support during both their construction
and management.
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Chapter 3
Assessing the risk of
earthquakes and floods in
Italy
This Chapter is a joint work with my supervisors Giorgio Stefano Gnecco
and Fabio Pammolli. The full text of the article is also available from the arXiv
repository, preprint number 2006.05840.
Abstract
According to the traditional statistical techniques, expected
losses can be extrapolated from the analysis of the histori-
cal records of past losses. Natural hazards, however, with
their long times to return rarely offer large databases to an-
alyze. To compensate for the lack of data, risk analysts thus
began to reconstruct the natural risk from soil or atmospheric
data, land registry and information on the vulnerability of the
structures exposed. Referring to the latter branch of research,
we propose here an analysis of seismic and alluvial risks for
the Italian residential building stock.
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3.1 Introduction
Expected losses are traditionally estimated from records of past
events, but when data are too scarce or not available, alternative tech-
niques are needed. During the last decades, a new family of models
inferring losses from the characteristics of soil and structures has
emerged (Grossi, Kunreuther, and Windeler, 2005). According to this
branch of literature, risk can be reconstructed as a combination of four
components:
• Hazard (H) provides a phenomenon description based on physical
measurements, usually frequency, severity, and location.
• Exposure (E) identifies the object at risk.
• Vulnerability (V ) defines the relationship between hazard and ex-
posure, quantifying the impact of the catastrophic event on the
property under analysis.
• Loss (L) converts physical damages into monetary values.
Each component is defined on a series of geophysical, engineering or
financial variables and relations, and equally contribute to the overall es-
timate of risk (Mitchell-Wallace et al., 2017). Through a proper definition
and combination of these components, a risk model should describe the
geological or environmental features of the peril in analysis and should
also capture differences in impacts on the relevant structural typologies.
Although this line of research is growing fast, not many models are
currently available and not any peril has been satisfactorily described.
Moreover, these models, while not requiring data on losses, need a large
amount of information on soil, weather, and housing. In addition to the
difficulty of finding this data, models strongly depend on geographical
and urban features of the area they have been defined on, and therefore
can hardly be adapted to other territories (Hufschmidt and Glade, 2010;
Scorzini and Frank, 2015). We propose new techniques for measuring
risk when historical data lack.
As far as Italy concerns, current literature offers some analysis that
allow to appreciate seismic risk on the whole territory, while little is still
known about floods. We therefore refer to the existing literature for seis-
mic risk and propose a more detailed representation of the probability
of earthquakes occurring. Our methodology is similar to Cesari and D’
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Aurizio (2019). A new model is developed for flood assessment in order
to compensate for the lack of knowledge about floods in Italy as well as
the scarcity of historical data and information on the basins. Although
better accuracy of the estimates is desirable for the future, our models
provide a quantification of losses at the individual and local level that
can support the authorities in risk management. For example, they can
set the basis for the construction of a public insurance system.
After a brief presentation of the database, the following two sections
present earthquake and flood risk assessment respectively. Although the
two model strongly differ, they both combine the four risk components
as:
Expected monetary damage = L× E ×
∫
V (H)d(H). (3.1)
After a general description of the model, each of these sections discuss
the components separately. The following section presents results and
then this chapter concludes with a discussion of our model’s uncertainty.
Our analysis considers residential housing only, furniture not included.
Multi-hazard risk assessment is postponed to Chapter 5.
3.2 Data
There is currently no database collecting records on impacts from nat-
ural disasters in Italy, but some information on national riskiness is avail-
able, thought data quality is sometimes questionable. In particular, our
models require data about hazard and exposure.
Hazard
While seismic hazard is well documented, flood data are strongly af-
fected by the lack of a single body responsible for physical detection.
Seismic movements are in fact regularly monitored by the National
Institute of Geophysics and Volcanology (INGV), that freely provides
daily updated databases both on past events and about several seismic
indicators. Records are georeferenced and cover almost all the national
territory, indicators are presented for different probability scenarios and
associated to an accuracy index. Data for the analysis of earthquake
has been drawn from INGV’s maps of seismic riskiness. On the other
side, flood monitoring is demanded to a number of regional authorities -
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named “basins’ authorities” - that independently choose collection meth-
ods and indicators. These differences in data collection often leads to in-
consistencies and poor comparability among regions (Molinari, Aronica,
et al., 2012). The main database on hydrological risk in Italy is the AVI
(“Aree Vulnerate Italiane” - “Italian Vulnerable Areas”) archive managed
by National Research Council (Guzzetti and Tonelli, 2004). The archive
collects historical information on flood events in Italy (mainly from 1900
to 2002). However, records are mostly gathered from local journals and,
unfortunately, are rarely suitable to scientific analysis: information are
provided in a narrative form, georeferencing is poor, physical phenom-
ena description is not uniform and data quality depends on the origi-
nal source (Molinari, Menoni, et al., 2014). Despite these limitations, the
archive is currently among the best representation of the flood hazard
and has therefore been used here. Information from the archive have
been integrated with data from “Italian Flood Risk Maps” (EU Directive
2007/60/CE) indicating the perimeter of geographic areas that could be
affected by floods according to three probability scenarios (Decreto Leg-
islativo 23 Febbraio 2010 n.49, 2010): extreme events with time to return
500 years (P1); events with time to return of 100-200 years (P2); events
with time to return between 20-50 years (P3).
Exposure
As far as exposure concerns, we refer to the “Mappa dei Rischi dei Co-
muni Italiani” (“Riskiness Map of Italian Municipalities” - MRCI). This
database has been created during a recent institutional project - “Casa
Italia” - to the aim of providing the best representation of major natural
risks in Italy (volcanic, seismic, hydrological, geological). Among sev-
eral risk indicators, the database presents a fairly rich representation of
Italian real estate. Additional information on regional average house’s
squared meters and the average dwelling value are estimates by the Rev-
enue Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate, 2015).
3.3 Earthquake
Earthquakes and land movements are among the most studied risks
in the literature, but most of the analysis focus on vulnerability and ex-
plore the relationship that links hazard intensity and damage to build-
ings. As far as Italy concerns, a few analysis investigate the number
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of deaths, missing persons and/or injured people (Cascini, Ferlisi, and
Vitolo, 2008; Salvati et al., 2010; Marzocchi et al., 2012), while, to our
knowledge, risk assessment on residential risk is presented in Asprone
et al. (2013) only. The latter model follows the structure specified in eq.
(3.1) and has been tested on the L’Aquila earthquake, therefore we are
referring to it for seismic loss estimates. Some slight modification of the
model has been introduced in order to update the analysis with latest
released data on hazard and to consider a wider range of potential loss
scenario. Moreover, our real-estate database provides a more detailed
representation of residential housing, thus allowing for higher accuracy
of the estimates.
Damages have been estimated per municipality relating the peak
ground acceleration (PGA) and its exceedance probability λ(PGA) with
the existing residential building stock by means of fragility curves. Given
a certain set of “limit states” (LS) representing subsequent level of dam-
age (usually from “no damage” to “collapse”), a fragility curve describes
the probability of reaching a given limit state as a consequence of the ob-
served PGA, P (LS|PGA). Expected loss can be estimated by comparing
fragility curves of each LS. Damages are then monetarily quantified by
means of a function RC(LS) linking the property’s value to the level of
damage.
Literature offers many fragility curves’ models, and we rely on As-
prone et al. (2013) selection for Italy (Table 4). Each model k applies to
a number of specific building structures and is defined on NLSk limit
states chosen by the authors to describe the impact of earthquakes on the
j-th structure. Since many models may address the same j-th structure,
losses are estimated by averaging results from the Kj models describing
j.
Municipal residential housing stock is divided into five relevant
structural typologies - thus fixing j = 1, . . . , 5 - and seismic losses per
square metre ls are computed for each j and each municipality c.
Given the probability Pk (LS + 1|PGA) of the structural typology j
of suffering a damage level LS given a certain PGA, expected losses are
estimated as:
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lsj,c =
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
NLSk∑
LS=1
RC(LS)
∫ ∞
0
[Pk (LS|PGA)− Pk (LS + 1|PGA)]
dFc (PGA) =
=
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
NLSk∑
LS=1
RC(LS) ·
∫ ∞
0
[Pk (LS|PGA)− Pk (LS + 1|PGA)]∣∣∣∣dλc (PGA)d(PGA)
∣∣∣∣d(PGA).
(3.2)
where Fc(PGA) = 1−λc(PGA) is the cumulative density function of
PGA for the c-th municipality. According to Asprone et al. (2013), we as-
sume Pk (NLSk + 1|PGA) = 0. Model (3.2) combines a probability distri-
bution with domain [0,∞) and a damage function increasing with PGA.
PGA is traditionally expressed in gravity acceleration units g and As-
prone et al. (2013) bounds the integration variable PGA to [0, 2g]. Since
we wanted to include as many scenarios as possible, we extended the do-
main to include even most unlikely events, and therefore the considered
domain is [0,∞).
The five municipal losses estimates have been multiplied by munici-
pal exposure and then aggregated into municipal total seismic losses Lsc.
Lsc =
5∑
j=1
lsj,c · Esj,c. (3.3)
3.3.1 Hazard
Seismic hazard is represented by PGA and its annual probability of
exceedance, which are both available on the INGV website (Gruppo di
Lavoro MPS, 2004) for most of Italy1.
INGV released seismic maps for 9 probabilities of exceedance in 50
years (Meletti and Montaldo, 2007). Those PGA measurements are pre-
sented for points in a 0.05-degree grid drawn on the Italian map. Grid
1Sardinia, Alicudi, Filicudi, Panarea, Pantelleria, Pelagie Islands, Stromboli, Ustica not
included.
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Figure 1: PGA exceedance probability.
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Note: the plot shows the PGA distribution of a random municipality. The
nine points are data by INGV, and the red line represent fitting with the
power law distribution.
42
points are defined by longitude and latitude and can be associated to a
municipality by means of reverse geocoding, that led to the definition of
a PGA distribution for over 4600 municipalities. Sometimes more points
referred to the same municipality, hence their average value has been
considered. In order to capture the widest possible representation of the
territory, missing municipalities have then been approximated by aver-
aging the neighbors’ PGA values. However, we failed to represent the
whole national territory since Sardinia and many other small islands can-
not be captured by neighborhood (missing municipalities can be seen in
Figure 7). Our database is thus composed of 7685 municipalities.
The 9 INGV measurements describe the tail of λ(PGA) for each grid
point (a grid point’s PGA curve example is plotted in Figure 1). As-
prone et al. (2013) assumed uniform seismicity in each municipality, but
the known curve’s sections in Figure 1 do not seem to reflect this hy-
pothesis. Moreover, since the left-side of the curve is missing, classical
fitting methodologies led to unsatisfactory results, often overestimating
tails. Therefore, parameters of the distribution have been estimated by
regression. Best fitting results have been obtained by the power law dis-
tribution.
In order for the hazard curves to reflect the soil category at the build-
ing foundation, O.P.C.M. 3274 (2003) and Decreto Ministeriale 14/01
(2008) state that PGA values at the bedrock should be multiplied by the
stratigraphic SS and topographic ST amplification factors. These factors
have been computed by Colombi et al. (2010) for all the Italian munici-
palities and kindly provided by INGV.
Table 3: Number of buildings per seismic structural typology.
Material Building Code Buildings (u=1000)
RC gl Reinforced concrete Gravity Load 2853.96
RC sl Reinforced concrete Seismic Load 636.92
M Masonry Gravity Load 6975.98
A gl Other Structures Gravity Load 1406.21
A sl Other Structures Seismic Load 260.88
3.3.2 Exposure
As seismic events differently affect buildings, relevant structural ty-
pologies have been identified based on the information available.
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First, the MRCI database divides municipal housing stock into: ma-
sonry, reinforced concrete, and other; Asprone et al. (2013) argue that
buildings of type “other” contain both components of reinforced con-
crete and masonry structures, so we assumed this category to be a mix-
ture of these two.
These structures may then have been built in compliance with mod-
ern anti-seismic requirements or not. Since the database does not in-
clude this information, we refer to the construction year and building
laws in force. In fact, from 1974 a series of subsequent laws (Legge n.
64, 2 feb, 1974) led to the progressive re-classification of risk-prone ar-
eas, where more restrictive anti-seismic construction requirements en-
tered into force, thus substantially modifying buildings’ structures. The
process ended in 2003 when anti-seismic laws (O.P.C.M. 3274, 2003) were
extended to the whole Italian territory. Thus, we define reinforced con-
crete and other structures as seismic loaded if built after these laws en-
tered into force, or gravity loaded otherwise2. According to Asprone et
al. (2013), we assumed masonry as seismic loaded only. Therefore, we re-
fer to 5 structural typologies (see Table 3) : masonry (M ), and gravity or
seismic loaded reinforced concrete (RC.gl and RC.sl), gravity or seismic
loaded other-type structures (A.gl and A.sl).
Since lsj,c is the expected seismic loss of the structure type j in the
municipality c per square metres, Esj,c is obtained by multiplying the
number of buildingsBj,c by the average apartment’s surface s̄c (Agenzia
delle Entrate, 2015) and the average number of apartments per building
Āc (ISTAT, census 2015):
Esj,c = s̄c ·Bj,c · Āc. (3.4)
3.3.3 Vulnerability
Seismic vulnerability is represented by fragility curves, that provide
the probability of exceeding a certain damage state, given some hazard
parameters. Several curves are offered by the seismic engineering liter-
ature, each referring to a specific building structural category. We rely
on Asprone et al. (2013) selection of curves, that is reported in Table 4.
2As far as the year of construction concerns, ISTAT does not specify the exact year in
which the building has been built, but a time interval which is approximately ten-years
long. We assumed that the number of buildings constructed in any year of the interval is
constant.
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Table 4: Fragility curves for seismic risk assessment.
Structure Model (k) NLSk
gravity load seismic load
µ σ µ σ
Masonry
Rota, Penna, and Strobbia (2008) 3
-2.03 0.36
-1.65 0.27
-1.35 0.22
Ahmad, Crowley, and Pinho (2011) 4
-1.13 0.35
-1.03 0.35
-0.85 0.26
-0.77 0.23
Erberik (2008) 2 -0.47 0.35-0.33 0.35
Lagomarsino and Giovinazzi (2006) 3
-1 0.41
-0.75 0.34
-0.61 0.37
Rota, Penna, and Magenes (2010) 3
-0.85 0.24
-0.7 0.18
-0.58 0.14
Reinforced Concrete
Kappos, Panagiotopoulos, et al. (2003) 4
-1.78 1.14 -1.32 0.29
-1.12 0.8 -0.95 0.27
-0.7 0.63 -0.57 0.27
-0.59 0.57 -0.24 0.28
Spence (2007) 4
-1.01 0.32 -0.87 0.29
-0.55 0.32 -0.46 0.28
-0.28 0.31 -0.02 0.29
-0.09 0.32 0.15 0.27
Crowley et al. (2008) 2 -0.77 0.24 -0.8 0.18-0.62 0.26 -0.61 0.22
Ahmad, Crowley, and Pinho (2011) 3
-1.07 0.22 -1.07 0.22
-0.91 0.29 -0.91 0.29
-0.59 0.26 -0.44 0.26
Borzi, Crowley, and Pinho (2007) 2 -0.74 0.32 -0.56 0.32-0.46 0.34 -0.37 0.33
Borzi, Crowley, and Pinho (2008) 2 -0.68 0.45 -0.41 0.35-0.41 0.36 -0.31 0.35
Kostov et al. (2004) 3
-0.48 0.47 -0.44 0.48
-0.34 0.48 -0.28 0.49
-0.29 0.48 -0.19 0.49
Kwon and Elnashai (2006) 2 -1.08 0.22-0.73 0.22
Ozmen et al. (2010) 2 -0.37 0.35 -0.36 0.3-0.17 0.23 -0.12 0.15
Kappos, Panagopoulos, et al. (2006) 4
-1.57 0.44 -1.14 0.43
-0.92 0.44 -0.57 0.43
-0.67 0.44 -0.18 0.43
-0.51 0.44 0.1 0.43
Tsionis, Papailia, and Fardis (2011) 2 -0.67 0.27 -0.64 0.28-0.22 0.38 0.18 0.79
Other Kostov et al. (2004) 3
-0.62 0.5 -0.52 0.49
-0.44 0.49 -0.34 0.49
-0.35 0.49 -0.24 0.49
Note: this Table reports the selection of seismic fragility curves per building
structural typology by Asprone et al. (2013).
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The selection contains 5 models for masonry structures, 11 for reinforced
concrete ones, and 1 for the other typology. Each model k is defined on a
different set of NLSk limit states representing building’s structural dam-
age conditions (the last limit state always corresponds to collapse) and
provides one fragility curve for each limit state. Our fragility curves are
log-normally shaped and require PGA values as unique input.
3.3.4 Loss
The loss component is represented by the function RC(LS) trans-
forming structural damages into monetary losses. We assume that the
property value equals its reconstruction cost - on average 1500 euro per
square meter, constant among all the municipalities (Agenzia delle En-
trate, 2015) - and define RC(LS) as a fraction of the total reconstruction
cost RC through a function RC(LS):
RC(LS) =
(
LS
NLSk
)α
RC. (3.5)
where each limit state is represented by a positive integer and NLSk is
the number of limit states of model k. According to Asprone et al. (2013),
we assume α = 1.
3.4 Flood
Hydraulic literature offers very little about flood damage in Italy be-
cause the lack of uniform data at national level hinders research in this
field. A few studies concern small geographical areas (usually cities,
sometimes sections of river basins) and focus on the estimation of dam-
ages in the immediate follow-up of an event. Most of the analysis study
the relationships between some flood’s physical measurements and ex-
pected losses, and the most common output are depth-percent damage
curves. Machine learning techniques have been recently applied to the
creation of river basins hazard maps (Degiorgis et al., 2012; Gnecco et
al., 2017). However, these techniques still require quite accurate data on
past loss. Few example of probabilistic risk assessment have been de-
veloped for other countries also, and, similarly to Apel et al. (2006), we
decided to extend the deterministic post-event models available in the
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literature to probabilistic assessment. In this respect, we estimated ex-
pected losses by means of depth-percent damage curves from the exist-
ing literature and additional information on hazard and exposure from
our database. In particular, two functions characterize our model: depth
damage curves g(·) and depth probability, that might be represented by
the density fδ(δ), the cumulative distribution Fδ(δ) and the exceedance
probability λ(δ) = 1− Fδ(δ).
Like seismic fragility curves, depth-damage curves refer to structural
typologies. In particular, we consider the buildings’ number of storeys
and classify the housing stock into 3 classes (j) - 1, 2 and 3 or more
storeys . A sample of depth-damage curves gj(δ) has been selected from
the engineering literature per each structural typology j. Unlike seis-
mic fragility curves, depth-damage curves do not specify the probability
that a given level of depth might produce a certain damage and return
the most likely outcome only. Moreover, the selected curves are “depth-
percent damage”, and indicate damages as percentages of property’s to-
tal value.
Given the building’s reconstruction cost RC, expected flood loss per
square meter lfj,c on a j-type building in the municipality c can be esti-
mated as:
lfj,c =
RC
100
∫ ∞
0
[
gj(δ)
∣∣∣∣d (λ (δ))dδ
∣∣∣∣]dδ =
=
RC
100
∫ ∞
0
[
gj(δ)
∣∣∣∣d [1− Fδ(δ)]dδ
∣∣∣∣]dδ =
=
RC
100
∫ ∞
0
gj(δ)fδ(δ)dδ.
(3.6)
By construction, there is a value δj,max after which a gj(δ) = 100. Thus,
equation (3.6) can be split in two parts as:
lfj,c =
RC
100
·
[∫ δmax
0
gj(δ)fδ(δ)dδ + 100 ·
∫ ∞
δmax
fδ(δ)dδ
]
. (3.7)
Bayes’ theorem allow us to express fδ(δ) as the product of the probability
of δ conditional to the occurrence of at least a flood event fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥
1) and the probability that at least one flood event occurs in a year:
fδ(δ) = P (NF ≥ 1)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1). (3.8)
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When estimating losses, we are considering NF ≥ 1 only, thus substitut-
ing eq. (3.8) into eq. (3.7) leads to:
lfj,c =
RC
100
· P (NF ≥ 1) ·
[∫ δmax
0
gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ+
+100 ·
∫ ∞
δmax
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
]
.
(3.9)
Since ∫ ∞
δmax
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ =1− Fδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1) =
= λδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
(3.10)
the model becomes:
lfj,c =
RC
100
· P (NF ≥ 1) ·
[∫ δmax
0
gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ+
+100 · λδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
]
.
(3.11)
Loss estimates per square meter per municipality and structural ty-
pology are multiplied by municipal exposure and aggregated into
municipal flood losses Lfc
Lfc =
3∑
j=1
lfj,c · E
f
j,c. (3.12)
3.4.1 Hazard
Flood hazard has been represented by frequency and depth probabil-
ities. Both the distributions have been estimated from the AVI database
and fitted by means of non-parametric techniques due to the lack of data.
Since AVI gathers information from local press, it is likely that most re-
mote events have not been captured. In particular, the number of floods
listed after 1900 in the AVI archive is much higher than those recorded
before and therefore we considered events occurred from that date on-
ward only. Unfortunately, only 795 events remain, and they are too few
to fit distributions at municipal level.
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Figure 2: Flood frequency distribution.
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Note: the plot divides observations (points) in two clusters: records from
municipalities with 0 < P2 < 0.5 and P2 ≥ 0.5. Both the clusters have
been fitted with a negative binomial, as shown by the black and red lines.
Frequency has been described by the probability density function of
the number of floods in a year fNF (NF ). In order to capture differ-
ences between the frequency of occurrence among the municipalities,
data have been divided into two clusters - AP1 (120 obs.) and AP2 (620
obs.) - on the basis of the hydrological hazard index P2 from MRCI.
Figure 2 shows that frequencies fAPNF approximate negative binomial be-
havior in both the two clusters. Despite the curves appear so close, they
strongly differ in mean (the average number of floods per year is 11.95
in AP1 and 42.58 in AP2 ).
The probability of flood returns in each cluster is then adapted to fit
the municipal and individual risk: since each flood involves a certain
number of municipalities within the cluster AP , the municipal probabil-
ity of experiencing at least one flood in a year is estimated by multiplying
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Figure 3: Depth probability distribution.
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Note: the dotted line is the empirical distribution fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1), and
colored lines shows fitting.
fAPNF times the average number c̄
f of municipalities flooded in AP over
the number of municipalities NAPc in AP :
F cNF (1) =
(
1− fAPNF (0)
) c̄f
NAPc
c ∈ AP . (3.13)
Floods usually strike several municipalities at the same time, but not all
the properties in a flooded municipality will be hit by the flood. There-
fore, the individual flood frequency does not coincide with the municipal
one. We approximated the individual frequency probability by means of
theP3 index in MRCI3, that indicates the percentage of municipal surface
flooded in a 20-50 years probabilistic scenario. We indicate the index as
3Indicators P3 are not available for the entire Italian territory, since data are missing for
part of Marche and Emilia-Romagna Regions.
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extP3. Assuming homogeneously distributed buildings among the mu-
nicipal area, the individual probability of flood returns is:
P (NF ≥ 1) = F cNF (1) · extc,P3. (3.14)
In addition to frequency, we estimate the probability of water to reach
a certain depth during a flood. Depth information are missing for most
of the events in the AVI database and sometimes are replaced by hy-
drometric heights measuring water depth from the riverbed. We ex-
cluded hydrometric heights and assumed that depth levels reported in
the database always correspond to the maximum reached in the area,
which is a reasonable hypothesis since records in AVI are largely gath-
ered from local press or compensation claims.
We found no significant difference in depth distributions between
differently-exposed areas AP but this may be due to the low amount
of available data, and therefore decided to estimate a unique function
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) for the entire national territory. Since a flood usually
hits more municipalities, a number of depth measurements are often re-
ported for the same event, but we represented each event with the max-
imum depth reported in the database. Hence, estimates have been com-
puted on 475 observations.
The depth empirical distribution estimated from AVI data
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) is shown in Figure 3, where a graphical compari-
son between some distributions is presented too. Satisfactory fittings
have been reached with the Generalized Beta (GB), the Generalized
Gamma (GG) and the Gamma distributions. Table 5 shows that GG and
GB’s led to similar sum of squared errors and sum of absolute errors,
while errors are much higher for the Gamma. The Chi squared goodness
of fit test confirms the higher performance of GG and GB with respect
to the Gamma, even though none of them reached a positive outcome.
However, the likelihood ratio test shows weak evidence that the GG
is more appropriate, therefore the Gamma has been chosen because of
computational advantages.
3.4.2 Exposure
When evaluating structural vulnerability to floods, the number of
storeys of the building is a fundamental feature to take into account.
Therefore, buildings have been classified in three groups according to
the number of storeys - one, two and three or more - in MRCI. Another
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Table 5: Flood depth distribution, goodness of fit.
SSE SAE
Gamma 0.02194857 0.2493763
GG 0.01328367 0.1951612
GB 0.01444061 0.2024778
Note: this Table shows the sum of squared errors (SSE) and sum of absolute
errors (SAE) obtained when fitting flood depth distribution with Gamma,
Generalized Gamma (GG) and Generalized Beta (GB) distributions.
element significantly affecting buildings resistance to floods is the pres-
ence/absence of a basement floor; since this information is not available,
we assumed the two features to be equally distributed.
Given the number of buildings per structural typology within the
municipality Bj,c, the average number of apartments per building Āc
(ISTAT, census 2015) and the average apartment’s surface s̄c (Agenzia
delle Entrate, 2015), exposure has been estimated as:
Efj,c = s̄c ·Bj,c · Āc. (3.15)
Table 6: Number of buildings per number of storeys.
Number of Storeys Buildings (u=1000)
1 2083.39
2 5981.26
3 or more 4123.05
3.4.3 Vulnerability
Flood’s vulnerability is evaluated by depth damage curves defined
on the building’s number of storeys. The most widely adopted curves
in hydraulic literature express damage as a percentage of building’s total
value and therefore called “depth-damage curves”. Conversely to the
curves expressing damages in absolute values, percentages curves are
not affected by monetary volatility and are more reliable (Appelbaum,
1985).
Many studies have led to the definition of different depth-percent
damage curves, that are strongly geographical-dependent (Scorzini and
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Figure 4: Depth-percent damage curves for flood risk assessment.
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Note: selection of depth-percent damage curves for flood risk assess-
ment. Curves are listed per buildings’ number of storeys and can refer to
dwellings with and/or without basement.
Frank, 2015): being derived from the analysis of historical data, they are
in fact defined on the characteristics of the area under analysis and tend
to lose accuracy when applied to contexts whose urban and territorial
features differ too much from the original site.
We have selected depth-percent damage curves from six previous
works (Appelbaum, 1985; Arrighi et al., 2013; Debo, 1982; Genovese,
2006; Luino et al., 2009; Oliveri and Santoro, 2000), all either defined or
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Figure 5: Depth-percent damage curves.
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Note: black lines represent the average values of the curves selected per
number of storeys. Red, green and blue lines show the functions fitted by
polynomial regression.
tested on Italian data. The selection is reported in Figure 4. Selected
curves per structural typology have then been averaged into three new
curves in order to guarantee higher reliability of results at the national
level. Curves have been fitted by polynomial regressions, as shown in
Figure 5.
3.4.4 Loss
Structural damages have been converted into monetary terms by
means of the function RC100 . Similar to the seismic model, we assume that
the property value is equal to its reconstruction cost - on average 1500
euro per square meter, constant among all the municipalities (Agenzia
delle Entrate, 2015).
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3.5 Results
Earthquake and flood losses have been estimated per municipality
and structural typology. Seismic risk is described in Table 8, where re-
sults from Asprone et al. (2013) are also reported for comparison. We
can note that, though the model adopted is the same, huge differences
emerge between the two analysis. Several reasons contribute to these
discrepancies and should be discussed for a better understanding of re-
sults.
First of all, (i) estimates are highly sensitive to the probability distri-
bution of hazard intensities, and while λ(PGA) has been here fitted from
INGV data, Asprone et al. (2013) rely on some distributional assumption.
In addition, (ii) we assumed PGA values ranging in [0,∞], while the pre-
vious analysis considers [0, 2g] only. (iii) INGV data on PGA fails to rep-
resent many smaller municipalities that have here been approximated by
means of neighbors’ values and this assumption may have further con-
tributed to the differences in results. (iv) Exposure strongly affect results
too and while MRCI collects the number of dwellings per structural ty-
pology at the municipal level, Asprone et al. (2013) had information at
the provincial level only. Moreover, MRCI refers to the 2011 population
census, while the database used by Asprone et al. (2013) date back to 10
years earlier.
Arguments (i)-(iv) determine the different loss scenario, and, in par-
ticular, Table 8 shows that estimated loss per square meter obtained by
our model are considerably lower than those of Asprone et al. (2013).
The main reason is the adoption of a power law distribution that concen-
trates the probability on weaker events. However, our model highlights
the gap in expected losses between more and less fragile buildings more
than the older version.
Though our losses per square meter are lower than previous findings,
the second column of the Table 8 (max(lsj,c)) describe similar patterns. By
contrast, expected losses per municipality and structural typology Lsj,c
in the third column do not even show the same pattern. As argued be-
fore, exposure strongly affect results and the detailed information on
buildings in MRCI allowed us to better represent real estate assets. In
fact, Rome is the biggest municipality in Italy, and therefore its exposure
produces expected losses that are extremely higher than those of other
municipalities. By contrast, the homogeneous distribution of provincial
structures among the municipalities in Asprone et al. (2013) very likely
underestimates the exposure of major areas.
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The fundamental role of exposure becomes clear when comparing lsj,c
and Lsj,c geographically. Figure 6 represents the expected loss per square
meter on the most vulnerable buildings - the masonry structures - in each
municipality. The map reflects the hazard component of the risk model
and clearly shows the proximity to risk sources. By contrast, this pattern
in risk distribution is not evident in Figure 7 showing annual total ex-
pected losses per municipality. In fact, the risky dark area delimited in
Figure 6 largely corresponds to the Appennino mountain chain, where
several municipalities are sparsely inhabited. On the other hand, densely
populated municipalities on the coast do not show extremely high level
of loss per square meter but reach the highest expected losses at the ag-
gregate level because of large real estates.
In order to appreciate the effect of different hazard and exposure com-
ponents, one can consider reinforced concrete gravity loaded structures:
though the power law distribution gets to a lower max(lsj,c), the associ-
ated estimate of the expected loss Lsj,c in Rome is four times greater than
that obtained in the previous paper.
Our analysis of seismic risk led to total expected loss equal to 6234.66
million, which is almost half the value obtained by Asprone et al. (2013).
The value is seven times greater than the expected loss estimated for
flood risk, equal to 875.90 million per year, thus indicating that the earth-
quakes are the natural hazard of main concern in Italy.
As far as flood losses concern, main findings are presented in Table 9.
Maximum losses per square meter lfj,c are higher than the seismic ones,
but Figure 8 shows that a great part of the territory does not appear to be
affected by hydrological risk and most municipalities are associated to
values of lfj,c close to 0. The map shows that the risk mostly affects north-
ern Italy, and in particular the Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Lombardia
regions. More or less the same risk distribution is obtained at the aggre-
gate level in Figure 9, where the effect of exposure highlights additional
areas of interest, such as the north-west coast, north Sardinia and Rome.
By comparing Figures 7 and 9, we can observe that north-east Italy
is highly affected by both the two hazards, though the effect of floods
remains consistently limited with respect to that of earthquakes. To con-
clude, Table 7 ranks the fifteen largest expected municipal losses per each
hazard. One can notice that three cities in Emilia-Romagna are listed for
both: Bologna, Ravenna and Rimini.
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Figure 6: Seismic expected loss per square meter (masonry buildings).
Note: the minimum value is lsj,c = 0.025, maximum is 12.69, and average
value is 2.23 euro per square meter.
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Figure 7: Expected seismic annual loss per municipality.
58
Figure 8: Flood expected loss per square meter (one-storey buildings)
Note: “Not at risk” identifies municipalities where lfj,c = 0. Among the
other municipalities, the minimum loss is 2.24e−08. Maximum value is
lfj,c = 19.61. On average, expected loss in risky areas (municipalities “Not
at risk” not included) is 0.37 euro per square meter.
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Figure 9: Expected flood annual loss per municipality.
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Table 7: Municipalities with higher expected loss per natural risk.
Seismic Expected Loss
Municipality Province Region Lsc(Mln euro)
1 Roma Roma Lazio 337.46
2 Napoli Napoli Campania 114.03
3 Bologna Bologna Emilia-Romagna 105.26
4 Verona Verona Veneto 59.58
5 Firenze Firenze Toscana 58.55
6 Torino Torino Piemonte 45.17
7 Reggio di Calabria Reggio di Calabria Calabria 43.23
8 Modena Modena Emilia-Romagna 39.57
9 Prato Prato Toscana 33.36
10 Terni Terni Umbria 33.03
11 Ravenna Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 31.69
12 Rimini Rimini Emilia-Romagna 30.38
13 Messina Messina Sicilia 29.92
14 Pistoia Pistoia Toscana 29.50
15 Catania Catania Sicilia 29.14
Flooding Expected Loss
Municipality Province Region Lfc (Mln euro)
1 Ferrara Ferrara Emilia-Romagna 56.22
2 Ravenna Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 52.89
3 Rimini Rimini Emilia-Romagna 45.03
4 Pisa Pisa Toscana 37.33
5 San Michele al Tagliamento Venezia Veneto 34.48
6 Jesolo Venezia Veneto 27.83
7 Parma Parma Emilia-Romagna 23.51
8 Bologna Bologna Emilia-Romagna 21.63
9 San Donà di Piave Venezia Veneto 21.31
10 Cesenatico Forlı̀-Cesena Emilia-Romagna 17.02
11 Piacenza Piacenza Emilia-Romagna 16.05
12 Cervia Ravenna Emilia-Romagna 15.40
13 Verbania Verbano-Cusio-Ossola Piemonte 14.58
14 Forlı̀ Forlı̀-Cesena Emilia-Romagna 13.33
15 Abano Terme Padova Veneto 12.94
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3.6 Uncertainty
The estimates obtained by the earthquake and flood models are built
on a set of hypotheses and parameters and are therefore uncertain.
An effective analysis to test the predictive capacity of a model is to
compare its estimates with the losses recorded from past events. How-
ever, it is not easy to find records that can be used for this comparison:
especially in countries where insurance does not reach high penetration
rates, the losses suffered by private buildings are difficult to trace. Typ-
ically, the amounts of public funds devolved for emergencies are avail-
able, which however do not represent the entire value lost by the house-
holders and often include the reconstruction of public goods and services
too. Moreover, even when suitable records are available, this analysis al-
lows to test all the components of the model except the hazard. Since
the exposure, vulnerability and loss components in the present model
are specified as in Asprone et al. (2013)4, we can refer to the analysis on
the L’Aquila earthquakes in 2009 and Molise in 2002 in Asprone et al.
(2013), the outcome of which suggests that the model has a satisfactory
descriptive capacity of the phenomenon.
As clearly shown in Table 8, the expected annual loss that we ob-
tain strongly diverge from that presented in the previous work and the
model therefore appears very sensitive to the distribution chosen to rep-
resent the earthquake’s probability of occurrence. Unlike Asprone et al.
(2013), however, our choice is supported by a fitting analysis which, al-
though not parametric, certainly allows a better representation of the
phenomenon. The choice of a power law distribution is also consistent
with the prevailing literature. Finally, it is interesting to note that IVASS
- the national Insurance Supervisory Institute - estimates the average an-
nual loss on residential buildings due to seismic events in Italy equal to
4.7 billion of Euro5. This value is quite close to the 6.2 billion we obtained
with the power law distribution, and very far from the 11.1 estimated in
Asprone et al. (2013).
As far as flood analysis concerns, the lack of records is once again
a major obstacle to the robustness analysis of the model and it is not
4The exposure does not perfectly coincide, but the data used in this analysis are taken
from the most updated release of the database used in the previous work. As the earth-
quakes used by Asprone et al. (2013) for the comparison happened before the last release
of the census and reshaped the local building estate, the previous database surely suits
better for the test, but might be less accurate for prediction today.
5See Cesari and D’ Aurizio (2019), pp. 35.
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Figure 10: Total expected losses as estimated by fitting the distributions over
all except one year of observations in the AVI database.
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Figure 11: Total expected losses as estimated by fitting the distributions
over all except one year of observations in the AVI database compared to
the number of depth observations available.
possible for us at the moment to compare the estimates with recent past
events. As shown by de Moel et al. (2015), modelling flood risk involves
various sources of uncertainty and it is often impossible to accurately
verify the predictive capacity of a model. Although this is not sufficient
to ascertain the robustness of our estimates, it is important to underline
that all depth-damage curves used in this study have been tested on past
events. Readers may refer to the related sources to check out on these
analyses.
Due to the lack of data on floods in Italy, official estimates of losses
are also rather scarce. To our knowledge, the only report in this re-
gard is ANIA and Guy Carpenter (2011), which estimates the residential
losses generated exclusively by river flooding equal to 230 million eu-
ros per year. This figure is not in itself comparable with our estimate,
which instead represents the losses generated by any type of alluvial
phenomenon, including flash floods and other intense rainfall events
that often affect the Country, but it is actually compatible. Moreover,
the report also estimates that the expected losses due to river floods con-
stitute about 8% of the total annual expected loss generated by both river
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floods and earthquakes. Our results suggest that this ratio, evaluated
considering any flood type, is approximately equal to 12%, and is there-
fore very similar to the results in ANIA and Guy Carpenter (2011).
Gamma GeneralizedGamma Weibull
max(lf1s,c) 19.61 19.80 19.68
max(lf2s,c) 15.16 15.34 14.90
max(lf3+s,c) 11.56 11.82 11.39
Lf (mln) 875.90 888.38 863.62
Variation in Lf +1.42% -1.40%
Table 10: Sensitivity analysis of the flood model to the choice of the distri-
butional form of depth.
Flood
The uncertainty in the estimates of flood losses can largely be traced
back to the hazard component of the model. We fitted the probability
distributions for frequency and depth on the AVI database, whose criti-
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Figure 12: Fitting of the flood frequency distribution of the first cluster.
Note: a similar plot is obtained for cluster 2.
Cluster 1
Distorsion -1% -0.5% +0.5% +1%
Size L
f (mln) 875.75 875.83 875.97 876.05
Variation in Lf -0.02% -0.01% 0.01% +0.02%
Mu L
f (mln) 875.87 875.89 875.91 875.92
Variation in Lf -0.003% -0.001% +0.001% +0.002%
Cluster 2
Distorsion -1% -0.5% +0.5% +1%
Size L
f (mln) 869.18 872.54 879.25 882.60
Variation in Lf -0.77% -0.38 +0.38% +0.76%
Mu L
f (mln) 875.50 875.71 876.08 876.23
Variation in Lf -0.05% -0.02% +0.02% +0.04%
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis of flood model to variation in the Negative
Binomial parameters.
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calities have already been discussed in paragraph 3.2. As typical of flood
events, AVI shows a great variability between the years of survey. As
shown in Figure 10, excluding one year of observations from the anal-
ysis does not overall significantly impact results. Two years exhibit the
strongest effect on the model and once excluded lead to the minimum
and the maximum expected losses respectively. These two years are 1966
and 1998 respectively, and there is no apparent reason why they should
be considered outliers, as no social event (e.g. wars) or change in technol-
ogy and in the data collection method may have influenced the detection
of floods during the two years.
The choice of years to be included in the fitting should be carefully
evaluated especially for the depth distribution, for which much less data
are available than for frequency. In fact, excluding one year from the
database involves a variable reduction in the number of depth obser-
vations, precisely equal to the number of floods recorded in the year.
Figure 11 compares the models outputs obtained by excluding one year
a time with the number of observations available for depth. The plot
shows that the fewer observations are considered, the lower the overall
loss estimates are. The phenomenon is not surprising, as it is normal for
years with greater flood intensity to record both more floods and greater
depths. However, it is important to consider that the impact of a de-
creased sample can be considerable in a context where the information
available are already quite scarce. This might be the case, for example,
of the minimum total expected losses obtained by excluding 1966. Nev-
ertheless, estimates fluctuate around the mean value, showing a quite
limited variability.
Beside the selection of the years in the database, the choice of the
flood distributions itself brings additional uncertainty to the model. In
particular, in the case of depth, it was possible to identify different dis-
tributive forms capable of satisfactorily describing the data. As it can be
noted in Table 10, either a generalized Gamma or a Weibull distribution
would have been adequate to describe the data, although the first leads
to overestimating losses with respect to the Gamma and the second to an
underestimate. In both cases, however, the difference in the outcome is
only 1.4%.
As far as frequency is concerned, the Negative Binomial distribution
achieves the highest goodness of fit and should hence be preferred to
any other distributional form. As clearly shown in Figure 12, even the
second best distributions - the Geometric and the Exponential - do not
properly fit the data, while the Negative Binomial suits them perfectly.
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Table 11 shows the sensitivity of the estimates to small variations of the
distribution parameters.
3.7 Conclusion
Seismic and flood risks in Italy have been analyzed. Given the lim-
ited amount of data available on natural risks, an alternative approach
based on risk-modeling has been applied to estimate expected monetary
losses. We found that seismic risk results in the highest expected losses
at national level, but floods may generate the highest losses per square
meter. The two perils differ in geographic extent: while the seismic risk
is relevant for almost all the national territory, floods affect a limited area.
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Chapter 4
A public-private insurance
for natural risks in Italy
This Chapter is a joint work with my supervisors Giorgio Stefano Gnecco
and Fabio Pammolli. The full text of the article is also available from the arXiv
repository, preprint number 2006.05840.
Abstract
We propose a public-private insurance scheme for earth-
quakes and floods in Italy in which property-owners, the in-
surer and the government co-operate in risk financing. Our
model departs from the existing literature by describing an
insurance scheme intended to relieve the financial burden
that natural events place on governments, while at the same
time assisting individuals and protecting the insurance busi-
ness. Hence, the business is aiming at maximizing social wel-
fare rather than profits. In order to evaluate the insurer’s loss
profile, spatial correlation among insured assets has been in-
cluded by means of the Hoeffding bound. Though earth-
quakes generate expected losses that are almost six times
greater than floods, we found that the amount of public funds
needed to manage the two perils is almost the same.
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4.1 Introduction
When constructing an insurance scheme, two fundamental quanti-
ties should be carefully evaluated: the premium per policyholder and
the amount of reserves needed for the business given the solvency con-
straint. In the private market, insurers aim at profit and constitutes re-
serves through premium’s collection. Therefore, rates should be suffi-
ciently high to yield profit and avoid unacceptable levels of loss, while at
the same time meeting an acceptable level of risk. Moreover, in order for
the policy to be purchased, premiums should also meet the demand. Pre-
mium rating can hence be represented as a typical decision problem of
profit and utility maximizing agents (Mossin, 1968; Ehrlich and Becker,
1972). However, when the government takes over the market, it radically
changes the management objectives of the insurance company, and the
traditional model is no longer suitable to capture agent’s behavior. In this
respect, this chapter presents a public-private insurance model for natu-
ral disasters where homeowners, insurers and government cooperate in
risk financing.
Although the traditional private insurance-model has to be suitably
modified to describe a public-private partnership, the problem can still
be represented by comparing two perspectives: on the one hand, indi-
viduals who are willing to spend up to a certain amount on coverage;
on the other hand, the insurer who, supported by the government, offers
the policy subject to some solvency constraints. Following the exam-
ple of some of the strongest public-private insurance systems for natural
disasters, we assume that each individual can access to a single policy
only and we exclude competing offers. Our model can therefore repre-
sent both an insurance monopoly (like Switzerland) or a public-private
insurance system with rates set by the State (like Japan). The next two
sections address the problem on the demand and supply perspectives
respectively.
On the demand side, individuals face a decision problem, and their
utility functions can be defined as in the private-market literature. Be-
cause the model looks for the maximum amount that individuals are
willing to pay, we keep the standard assumption of perfect information
and rationality of individuals, though these hypotheses are often criti-
cized as inappropriate to describe real world conditions (Goda, Wenzel,
and Daniell, 2015; Skees, Hazell, and Miranda, 1999; Kunreuther and
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Pauly, 2004).1 These criticisms are extremely important for the private
market, but might be more easily overcome by governments, as they
have a stronger ability to modify the behavior of individuals by investing
in risk education or promoting public awareness.
On the supply side, the goal of insurance business is substantially
affected by the partnership with the government. In the free market,
insurer’s goal is profit maximization subject to survival and/or stabil-
ity constraints that require low ruin probability and low probability of
high operational costs (Goda, Wenzel, and Daniell, 2015). By contrast,
when entering the business, the government forces insurers to set the
lowest premium possible given both the demand and the solvency con-
straints. Our model departs from traditional literature by assuming that
the business endorses social welfare and therefore rates do not include
profit-load. On the other side the government also supports the business
by relaxing its financial burden: it partially subsidises reserves through
capital injections and contributes to the reimbursement whenever stored
funds are not sufficient for claim compensation.
Several additional issues arise in specifying the supply side. In par-
ticular, insurers’ solvency constraint refers to the aggregate loss distribu-
tion, which is difficult to represent due to lack of information. While ex-
pected losses can be reconstructed through risk modeling as in Chapter
3, particular attention should be devoted to the variance as spatial corre-
lations strongly affect insurer’s potential of extreme losses. Quantifying
correlation is difficult when records of past events are available, and it
is practically impossible when they are not. However, it is reasonable to
assume that spatial correlation between municipalities depends on their
proximity, so that it can be identified a sufficiently large threshold r such
that two municipalities that are at least r-km far away are independent.
We assume r = 50 km and include spatial correlation by means of the
Hoeffding bound for r-dependent variables.
In addition to risk quantification, private insurers are also affected by
state regulations, market competition (Grossi, Kunreuther, and Windeler,
2005) and social or political decisions that may result in moral hazard
1Common shared information between insurer and insured is questionable in real con-
texts (Cooper and Hayes, 1987; Kunreuther and Pauly, 1985). In addition to lack of data
for risk assessment, individuals also have to face limited cognitive capacity (Kahneman,
2003; Goda, Wenzel, and Daniell, 2015) and imperfect rationality: Kunreuther (1996) as-
serts that policy adoption conveys individual risk perception; Palm (1995) observes that
appreciation of earthquake policies’ benefits depends on personal attitude, socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics, proximity to physical hazards, and past experience.
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and adverse selection (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2009). Coordinating gov-
ernment and insurers actions can prevent these drawbacks, that should
therefore not be included in the public-private model.
Finally, agents’ attitudes toward risk should also be carefully eval-
uated. While in the literature is widespread agreed that homeowners
are risk-averse, some evidence suggests that insurers may also exhibit
risk-aversion (Gollier, 2013). Actuarial practice also encourages cautious
behaviors, emphasizing the importance of adjusting rates by a risk-load
component proportional to aggregate loss variance for extraordinary un-
certain events such as natural hazards (Kunreuther, 1996; Larsen and
Kuzak, 2005). However, by entering the business as a guarantor, the gov-
ernment release the insurer from its strict capital constraint and there is
no need for the insurer to over-protect the reserves. We thus assume
risk-averse homeowners and a risk-neutral insurer.
The two agent’s perspectives are combined in Section 4.4 where the
insurance scheme is defined. The application to Italian data is discussed
in the following section and results for both the two hazards conclude
the chapter. Four different policies have been estimated and, thought
seismic risk generates highest expected losses, the analysis shows that
almost the same amount of public funds is necessary to manage the two
risks. This Chapter discusses single hazards policies only, multi-hazard
analysis follows in the next Chapter.
4.2 Homeowner’s purchase decision
Since the seminal papers by Mossin (1968) and Ehrlich and Becker
(1972), several premium setting models on insurance purchase decision
have been developed. These models describe policies offered by the pri-
vate sector and set premiums by comparing the risk-averse individual’s
willingness to pay with the profit maximization sought by the insurer.
Thought we are considering a public-private partnership, individual’s
willingness to pay is left substantially unchanged. This section deals
with the demand side, defines the utility function of the owners, and
gets to the maximum premium that they are willing to pay.
Let us consider a single peril insurance (i.e. earthquakes or floods
only) in Italy. Any generic homeowner i has an mi square meters prop-
erty. The Ni individuals gather in municipalities, thus any i belongs to
a generic Italian municipality c. A negative event has an annual prob-
ability 1 − πc(0) to hit the Municipality c and ruin the i-th individual
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property at time t causing a loss lai,t per square meter. Consider discrete
time period t equal to one year.
Individual i may incur in a loss lai,t with probability 1 − πc(0), i ∈ c.
This loss affects his wealth wi,t, that we assume equal to the house value
for simplicity. However, the individual may buy an insurance coverage
and pay a premium pi,t per square meter to get a reimbursement xi,t per
square meter in case that the event occurs. Let us define xi,t as a function
of the actual loss lai,t:
xi,t =
{
0, with probability πc(0),
x
(
lai,t
)
, with probability 1− πc(0),
(4.1)
where
0 < x
(
lai,t
)
≤ lai,t, i ∈ c, (4.2)
with
x
(
lai,t
)
=

0 if lai,t ≤ D,
lai,t −D if D < lai,t < E +D,
E if lai,t ≥ E +D,
(4.3)
where D and E are the deductible and the maximum coverage provided
per square meter by the insurer.
The homeowner’s utility of not being insured is traditionally ex-
pressed as the sum of two components representing the case of no events
occurring during the year and a unique loss scenario:
Unot insured = πc(0)u(wi,t) + (1− πc(0))u(wi,t − l
a
i,tmi,t). (4.4)
Similarly, the utility of purchase is defined as:
Uinsured =πc(0)u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t)+
+ (1− πc(0))u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t − lai,tmi,t + x
(
lai,t
)
mi,t).
(4.5)
Therefore, assuming rational behavior, we can assume that the home-
owner will buy an insurance coverage for its property if and only if its
utility of purchasing is greater than or equal to that of not purchasing the
policy: Uinsured ≥ Unot insured.
Considering any possible loss level, hence any possible phenomena
intensity ζ, we can define the probability πc(ζ) that c will experience a ζ-
intensity event in a year and that the homeowner i living in municipality
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cwill suffer a loss lai,t(ζ) expressed as a function of ζ. In case he is owning
a residential insurance coverage, its claim value will be then:
xi,t =
{
0, with probability πc(0),
x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
, with probability πc(ζ),
(4.6)
where
0 < x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
≤ lai,t, with i ∈ c (4.7)
with
x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
=

0 if lai,t(ζ) ≤ D,
lai,t(ζ)−D if D < lai,t(ζ) < E +D,
E if lai,t(ζ) ≥ E +D
(4.8)
and the insured purchase-convenience condition becomes:
πc(0) · u(wi,t) +
∫ ∞
0
πc(ζ) · u(wi,t − lai,t(ζ)mi,t)dζ
≤ πc(0) · u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t) +
∫ ∞
0
πc(ζ)·
u(wi,t − pi,tmi,t − lai,t(ζ)mi,t + x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
mi,t)dζ.
(4.9)
According to the traditional literature on insurance purchasing de-
cision, we assume the individual to be risk-averse and we represent its
preferences by means of the utility function u(x) = log(x+1). We set wi,t
equal to the house value and assume for simplicity that it corresponds
to the reconstruction cost, equal to RC per square meter. The logarith-
mic specification allows us to simplify the model considering losses per
square meter, so we can rewrite eq. (4.9) as:
πc(0) · log(RC + 1) +
∫ ∞
0
πc(ζ) log(RC − lai,t(ζ) + 1)dζ
≤ πc(0) · log(RC − pi,t + 1)+∫ ∞
0
πc(ζ) log(RC − pi,t − lai,t(ζ) + x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
+ 1)dζ.
(4.10)
We assume that the premium pi,t is fixed at t = 0 and does not vary
with respect to time, pi,t = pi, and neither do inhabited square meters,
so mi,t = mi. We can compute the highest premium that homeowners
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are willing to pay by restricting condition in eq. (4.10) to the equality,
obtaining:
πc(0) · log
(RC + 1)
(RC − pi + 1)
+
+
∫
πc(ζ) log
(RC − lai,t(ζ) + 1)
(RC − pi − lai,t(ζ) + x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
+ 1)
dζ = 0.
(4.11)
This equality states that the individual is indifferent to the decision to
purchase the policy or not, and allows us to derive the risk-based max-
imum premium pHi that the individual is willing to pay per structural
typology and municipality.
4.3 Public-private partnership
We now consider the supply side, where the insurer and the govern-
ment cooperate in risk management. As previously discussed, the goal
of the business is maximizing social well-being, while financially pro-
tecting the insurer. Therefore, the government forces insurers to apply
the lowest possible premiums, given both the demand and the solvency
constraints, and offers its support to the business by partially subsidizing
reserves and committing to pay reimbursements whenever the reserve is
not sufficient for claim compensation.
As the demand can be represented through the maximum premium
that individuals are willing to pay, supply is concerned about the con-
stitution of reserves in order to cope with possible future claims. At the
beginning of the activity, say t = 0, the insurer should create a reserveW ,
that will be increased every year by annual premiums pi collected from
the Ni individuals. Since the government supports the insurers, the re-
serve is partially subsidized by public capitals. Assume for simplicity
that all the premiums are paid at the beginning of the year, while claims
are paid when experienced. Hence, a minimum capital requirement Wd
should be fixed, so that the government will have to pay Wd in t = 0 and
to refill the fund at the end of the year t if Wt goes below this threshold.
So, at the beginning (b) of the year t = 0 the initial reserve W b0 is created:
W b0 = Wd +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi, (4.12)
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and at the end (e) of the year it will be decreased of the total amount of
reimbursement paid during the year:
W e0 = W
b
0 −
Ni∑
i=1
xi,0mi. (4.13)
Since claims x
(
lai,t(ζ)
)
may incur at any random time t and more events
may happen close in time, the minimum capital requirement Wd is nec-
essary to guarantee money availability for reimbursement with a suffi-
ciently high probability. Thus, if W e0 < Wd the government will refill it
with an additional amount Wr = Wd −W e0 .
At any subsequent time t, the fund value at the beginning of the year
is:
W bt = Wt−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi with Wt−1 = max(W et−1;Wd), (4.14)
while at the end it will be:
W et = W
b
t −
Ni∑
i=1
xi,tmi. (4.15)
However, the insurer is legally asked to meet some solvency constraint
and hence need the government to setWd such that the probability of not
being able to promptly pay the claims (“insolvency” probability) below
a certain low value ε1.
Let us assume that a negative event hits any building within a mu-
nicipality. We assume that every policy can generate at most one claim
per year and per individual; since reconstructing or restoring a building
requires long time, this hypothesis is reasonable. Moreover, assume that
actual square meter losses lai,t are equal for all the individuals within the
same municipality and so does xi,t. Consider the Nc municipalities in
Italy and indicate the total number of inhabited squared meters in the
municipality c as Mc, we have:
Mc =
∑
i∈c
mi,
∑
i∈c
xi,tmi = Xc,tMc, (4.16)
hence
Xc,t =
∑
i∈c xi,tmi
Mc
, (4.17)
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so we can compute the total amount of claims as:
Yt =
Ni∑
i=1
xi,tmi =
Nc∑
c=1
∑
i∈c
xi,tmi =
Nc∑
c=1
Xc,tMc. (4.18)
Since our policy covers at most one claim per year and per individual,
claim occurrence per year and per municipality can be modelled as a
Bernoulli random variable X̄c,t ∼ Ber(qc) Olivieri and Pitacco (2010)
X̄c,t =
{
1 with probability qc,
0 with probability 1− qc.
(4.19)
with qc = πc (ζ > ζD) and ζD such that lai,t(ζD) = D.
We can rewrite Yt as:
Yt =
Nc∑
c=1
Xc,tMc =
Nc∑
c=1
McX̄c,tx
(
lac,t,j
)
=
=
Nc∑
c=1
X̄c,t
∑
j
Mj,cx
(
lac,t,j
)
=
Nc∑
c=1
X̄c,tac,t,
(4.20)
where j indicates the structural typology and Mj,c is the number of
squared meters of properties of type j in municipality c.
A main issue related to covering natural disasters is the high level of
correlation between individual risks, which makes the description of the
probability distribution of Yt non-trivial. There is no physical bound for
energy propagation and this means that we cannot consider municipal-
ities as perfectly independent among each other, especially in the earth-
quakes’ case. By the way, natural phenomena hit neighbor cities, but far
enough municipalities fairly never experience the same event. Therefore,
it could be found a certain distance r such that municipalities whose cen-
troids are at least r km far are independent. This assumption is similar
to the Hoeffding (1963)’s definition of (r− 1)-dependence, and allows us
to follow his work to model the national claim amount Yt.
We sample municipalities in Ng groups Y g of independent units,
namely we create the groups in such a way that all the municipalities
within a group are at least r km apart from each other. The number ng of
municipalities in group g varies.
The total amount of claims in Italy can thus be obtained as:
Yt = Y
1
t + Y
2
t + Y
3
t + · · ·+ Y
Ng
t , (4.21)
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with
Y gt =
∑
c∈g
X̄c,tac,t, c = 1, . . . , ng. (4.22)
Each group claim amount Y gt is the sum of ng independent and bounded
random variables.
Assuming that the hazard distribution does not vary with respect to
time too, expected losses do not depend on t, and neither do E [Yt] and
E [Y gt ]. Considering that
∫ ζD
0
πc(ζ)x
[
laj,c (ζ)
]
dζ = 0, the g-th group ex-
pected value:
E [Y gt ] = E [Y
g] =
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
0
πc(ζ)x
[
laj,c (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,c · E
[
x
(
laj,c
)]
.
(4.23)
The expected total amount of claims in Italy is:
E [Yt] = E [Y ] =
Ng∑
g=1
E [Y g] . (4.24)
Now we can define the insolvency probability at time t, and impose an
upper bound ε1 on it:
Prob
{
Wt−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi − Yt < 0
}
< ε1, (4.25)
or equivalently:
Prob
{
Yt > Wt−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi
}
< ε1. (4.26)
We consider the worst case scenario Wt−1 = Wd:
Prob
{
Yt > Wd +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi
}
< ε1. (4.27)
The minimum capital requirement Wd that the government should guar-
antee is then obtained by applying the Hoeffding (1963) bound to our
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weighted sum of independent and bounded random variables:
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φE
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y
g ])
]
, h1 > 0,
(4.28)
with wg =
ng
Nc
.
Set
Wd +
Ni∑
i=1
pimi = Ncφ+ E [Y ] , (4.29)
and fix the right hand side of eq. (4.28) equal to ε1:
ε1 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φE
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y
g ])
]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wgE
[
e
h1
ng
Y gt e
− h1ng E[Y
g]
]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E[Y
g]
E
[
e
h1
ng
Y gt
]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E[Y
g]
E
[
e
h1
ng
∑
c∈g X̄c,tac,t
]
.
(4.30)
The last expected value in eq. (4.30) is the moment generating function
of the sum of random variablesMY gt
(
h1
ng
)
:
E
[
e
h1
ng
∑
c∈g X̄c,tac,t
]
=
∏
c∈g
MY gt
(
h1
ng
)
=
∏
c∈g
MX̄c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
, (4.31)
hence eq. (4.30) can be rewritten as:
ε1 = e
−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E[Y
g]
∏
c∈g
MX̄c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
. (4.32)
Solving eq. (4.32) we obtain φ as:
φ =
1
h1
log

∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h1ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
ε1
 (4.33)
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and estimate Wd from eq. (4.29):
Wd = Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
pimi. (4.34)
Eq. (4.34) may result in a negative value of Wd, but we bind possible
solutions to
W ∗d ≥ 0. (4.35)
In case of Wd < 0, we assume that the government will decide to set it
equal to 0 and keep an insolvency probability even lower than the de-
sired level: ε∗1 ≤ ε1.
Moreover, it is reasonable to suppose that the government aims to
minimize the probability to refill the fund with additional capital Wr =
Wd −W et , so it will need to set a premium sufficiently high to guarantee
a low probability bounded from above by ε2 to pay that quantity at any
time t:
Prob
{
Wd −W et > 0
}
=Prob
{
Wd −Wt−1 −
Ni∑
i=1
pimi + Yt > 0
}
< ε2.
(4.36)
Once again, consider the worst case scenario Wt−1 = Wd:
Prob
{
Wd −Wd −
Ni∑
i=1
pimi + Yt > 0
}
= Prob
{
Yt −
Ni∑
i=1
pimi > 0
}
< ε2,
(4.37)
or equivalently:
Prob
{
Yt >
Ni∑
i=1
pimi
}
< ε2. (4.38)
Note that this condition applies a new constraint on the premiums’
value.
Given a sufficiently low probability ε2, we can define the minimum
amount of total premiums by applying again the Hoeffding (1963) in-
equality:
Prob
{
Yt > Ncγ + E [Y ]
}
< e−h2γ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h2ng E[Y
g ]
∏
c∈g
MX̄c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
,
(4.39)
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where h2 > 0. Set
ε2 = e
−h2γ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h2ng E[Y
g ]
∏
c∈g
MX̄c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
(4.40)
and get
γ =
1
h2
log

∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h2ng E[Y
g]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
ε2
 (4.41)
which in turn allows us to estimate the minimum allowable value of the
sum of premiums
∑Ni
i=1 p
G
i mi:
Ni∑
i=1
pGi mi = Ncγ + E [Y ] . (4.42)
4.4 Insurance model
The maximum value pHi that each individual is willing to pay in eq.
(4.11) and the minimum amount of total premium necessary to avoid ex-
cessive government risk-exposure
∑Ni
i=1 p
G
i mi in eq. (4.42) are the two
constraints that the supply faces when defining a national insurance
scheme. The two equations pose conditions on rates and they may either
identify a range of possible values or fail to find a unique solution. How-
ever, since we are focused on a publicly supported insurance scheme,
it is reasonable to assume that the government will keep the premium
as low as possible in order not to financially over-stress homeowners,
though this may imply a higher probability of found refill at each t, thus
a greater risk for public resources. Therefore, given the desired proba-
bility ε2 of government non-financial over-stress we define the optimal
premium level p∗i as:
p∗i = min(c, 1) · pHi with c =
∑Ni
i=1 p
G
i mi∑Ni
i=1 p
H
i mi
. (4.43)
Premiums as defined in eq. (4.43) are risk-based on municipality haz-
ard and individual structural typology, thus guaranteeing social fairness.
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Moreover, the equation implies that:
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi = min(c, 1)
Ni∑
i=1
pHi mi = min
(
1,
1
c
) Ni∑
i=1
pGi mi =
= min
(
1,
1
c
)
(Ncγ + E [Y ]) = Ncγ
∗ + E [Y ] ,
(4.44)
thus γ∗ is
γ∗ =
min
(
1, 1c
)
(E [Y ] +Ncγ)E [Y ]
Nc
≤ γ (4.45)
and the insurer is thus able to guarantee an upper bound ε∗2 on the prob-
ability to refill the fund equal to:
ε∗2 =
∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h2ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
eh2γ∗
≥ ε2. (4.46)
Given the desired upper bound on insolvency probability ε1, the optimal
capital minimum requirementW ∗d is then obtained from condition (4.34):
W ∗d = max
{
Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi; 0
}
= Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi,
(4.47)
with
φ∗ =
W ∗d +
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
imi − E [Y ]
Nc
≥ φ. (4.48)
Thus, the optimal value ε∗1 is:
ε∗1 =
∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h1ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
eh1φ∗
. (4.49)
Since ε1 decreases as φ increases, the optimal insolvency probability will
be at most equal to the level desired by the insurer: ε∗1 ≤ ε1.
Moreover, note that:
W ∗d = Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
p∗imi = Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ]− E [Y ]−Ncγ∗ =
= Nc (φ
∗ − γ∗) .
(4.50)
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From eq. (4.46) and (4.49), γ∗ and φ∗ can be defined as:
γ∗ =
1
h2
log

∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h2ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)
ε∗2
 (4.51)
and
φ∗ =
1
h1
log

∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h1ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)
ε∗1
 . (4.52)
Given the condition in eq. (4.35), eq. (4.50) implies
(∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h1ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h1
ng
)) 1h1
(∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h2ng E[Y
g ]∏
c∈gMX̄c,tac,t
(
h2
ng
)) 1h2 · (ε
∗
2)
1
h2
(ε∗1)
1
h1
≥ 1. (4.53)
In particular, if a parameter h = h1 = h2 is chosen, eq. (4.50) becomes
W ∗d =
Nc
h
log
(
ε∗2
ε∗1
)
. (4.54)
Eq. (4.54) shows that the amount of public resources needed increases
with the ratio ε∗2/ε∗1, and more importantly, eq. (4.53) collapses to:
ε∗2 ≥ ε∗1, (4.55)
indicating that insolvency should never be preferred to the disbursement
of public funds, thus enforcing the government role of social guarantor.
The minimum W ∗d value corresponds to ε
∗
1 = ε
∗
2 and is equal to 0.
However, ε∗2/ε∗1 affects W ∗d logarithmically, while the capital require-
ment is largely determined by Nc/h. Therefore, W ∗d is directly propor-
tional to the number of municipalities, and inversely related to the pa-
rameter h, whose value is determined by the government’s initial prefer-
ences ε1 and ε2 and the overall risk distribution.
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4.5 Application
4.5.1 Individuals’ willingness to pay for seismic policies.
Premium model application to the seismic case requires particular at-
tention due to the hazard component ζ = PGA. We can estimate π(ζ)
as π(PGA) = |dλ(PGA)d(GPA) |. The absence of seismic movements ζ = 0 cor-
responds to the case of no seismic event happening in the year, thus we
have li,t(0) = 0 and x (li,t(ζ)) = 0. This allows us to include the case of
no seismic event in the integral term of condition (4.11):∫ ∞
0
πc(PGA) log
(RC − lai,t(PGA) + 1)
(RC − pi,t − lai,t(PGA) + x
(
lai,t(PGA)
)
+ 1)
d(PGA) =
= 0.
(4.56)
In Section 3.3.1 we have shown that λc(PGA) approximately behaves as
a Power Law distribution and therefore we have:
πc(PGA) =
∣∣∣∣d(λ(PGA))d(PGA)
∣∣∣∣ = αcPGA−βc , (4.57)
whose domain does not include values in [0, PGAminc [, with
PGAminc = e
log( αcβc−1 )
βc−1 . (4.58)
This implies that, in this case, the integral in condition (4.56) cannot be
evaluated in [0,+∞[ but in [PGAminc ,+∞[ only. However, PGAminc
take values ranging from 7.92e−09 to 0.002, and are small enough to in-
clude the case of no seismic loss.
The loss function per structural typology laj,t(PGA) is derived from
eq. (3.2):
laj,t(PGA) =
1
Kj
Kj∑
k=1
Nk∑
LS=1
RC(LS) · [Pk (LS|PGA)− Pk (LS + 1|PGA)] ,
(4.59)
with Pk (NLSk + 1|PGA) = 0.
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Condition (4.11) for seismic risk becomes:
∫ ∞
PGAminc
αcPGA
−βc log
(
RC − lai,t(PGA) + 1
RC − pi,t − lai,t(PGA) + x
(
lai,t(PGA)
)
+ 1
)
d(PGA) = 0.
(4.60)
4.5.2 Individuals’ willingness to pay for flood policies.
The premium model application to flood is simpler with respect to the
seismic. Here, hazard is represented by depth ζ = δ and li,t(δ) is obtained
by the depth-percent damage curve gj(δ) for the number of storeys j.
The probabilistic component πc(ζ) is given by f(NF ) defined in equation
(3.8), whose estimation has been discussed in Section 3.4.1. We define the
individual flooding probability from equation (3.14) as:
P (NF ≥ 1) = (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c̄f
NAPc
. (4.61)
The probability of no flood events in a year πc(0) is then defined as:
fNF (0) =
[
1− (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c̄f
NAPc
]
:= πc(0); (4.62)
while πc(δ) corresponds to:
πc(δ) = (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c̄f
NAPc
· fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) (4.63)
So condition (4.11) becomes:[
1− (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c̄f
NAPc
]
· log
(
RC + 1
RC − pi,t + 1
)
+
+(1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 ·
c̄f
NAPc
·
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)·
· log
(
RC − RC100gj(δ) + 1
RC − pi,t − RC100 · gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100 · gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ = 0.
(4.64)
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We focus on the integral in the second term, and split it into two compo-
nents:
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)·
· log
(
RC − RC100 · gj(δ) + 1
RC − pi,t − RC100 · gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100 · gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ =
=
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
−
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)·
· log
(
RC − pi,t −
RC
100
· gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100
· gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ,
(4.65)
then, we consider them separately.
Since gj is a positive non-decreasing function that becomes constant
at level 100% corresponding to a certain depth δmax, the first integral can
be simplified to:
∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ =
=
∫ δmax
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
+
∫ ∞
δmax
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log (1) dδ =
=
∫ δmax
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ. (4.66)
The second integral involves two piecewise functions: gj(δ) and
x (gj(δ)). Defining δD such that gj(δD) · RC100 = D and δE such that
gj(δE) · RC100 = E +D and considering δmax, we can split it into 4 compo-
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nents:∫ ∞
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)·
· log
(
RC − pi,t −
RC
100
· gj(δ) + x
[
RC
100
· gj(δ)
]
+ 1
)
dδ =
=
∫ δD
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t −
RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
+ log (RC − pi,t −D + 1) ·
[
Fδ|NF (δE |NF ≥ 1)− Fδ|NF (δD|NF ≥ 1)
]
+
+
∫ δmax
δE
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t −
RC
100
· gj(δ) + E + 1
)
dδ+
+ log (E − pi,t + 1)
[
1− Fδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
]
. (4.67)
Summing up, insured purchasing indifference condition (4.11) for the
flood case study is:
[
1− (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 · c̄
f
]
· log
(
RC + 1
RC − pi,t + 1
)
+
+ (1− fAPNF (0)) · extc,P3 · c̄
f ·
·
{∫ δmax
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
−
∫ δD
0
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t −
RC
100
· gj(δ) + 1
)
dδ+
− log (RC − pi,t −D + 1) ·
[
Fδ|NF (δE |NF ≥ 1)− Fδ|NF (δD|NF ≥ 1)
]
+
−
∫ δmax
δE
fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1) · log
(
RC − pi,t −
RC
100
· gj(δ) + E + 1
)
dδ+
− log (E − pi,t + 1)
[
1− Fδ|NF (δmax|NF ≥ 1)
]}
= 0. (4.68)
4.5.3 Aggregate claim distribution
In order to apply the model, MX̄c,tac,t
(
h
ng
)
should be defined and
perhaps some distributional assumption should be introduced. The best
distributional form depends on the scope of the coverage, and the anal-
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ysis might rather compare multiple significant scenarios represented by
alternative distributional hypotheses.
An informative choice is focusing on the expected value of claims,
and thus assuming that Yt is a weighted sum of Bernoulli random vari-
ables. Assuming that the properties within a municipality are perfectly
correlated, Yt equal to:
Yt =
Nc∑
c=1
Xc,tMc =
Nc∑
c=1
McX̄c,t
∫ ∞
ζD
πc (ζ|ζ > ζD)x
[
lac,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
Nc∑
c=1
X̄c,t
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
πc (ζ|ζ > ζD)x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
Nc∑
c=1
X̄c,tac.
(4.69)
Note that now parameters ac do not depend on time t and are constants.
The expected reimbursement of the g-th group E [Y gt ] in eq. (4.23) there-
fore becomes
E [Y gt ] =
∑
c∈g
qcac =
=
∑
c∈g
π (ζ > ζD)
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
πc (ζ|ζ > ζD)x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
∑
c∈g
π (ζ > ζD)
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
πc (ζ)
πc (ζ > ζD)
x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
=
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,c
∫ ∞
ζD
πc (ζ)x
[
laj,c,t (ζ)
]
dζ =
∑
c∈g
∑
j
Mj,cE
[
x
(
laj,c,t
)]
,
(4.70)
and the moment generating function of X̄c,tac can be written through the
probability generating function of a weighted sum of Bernoulli variables:
MX̄c,tac
(
h
ng
)
= GX̄c,tac
(
e
h
ng
)
=
[
1 +
(
e
h
ng
ac − 1
)
qc
]
. (4.71)
However, since Bernoulli variables are bounded in [0, 1], each Y gt is
bounded between 0 ≤ Y gt ≤
∑
c∈g ac = bg . In the seismic model,
asc =
∑
k
xsk,c (4.72)
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with
xsk,c =
∫ ∞
PGAminc
x
(
1
Mk
Mk∑
j=1
Nk∑
LS=1
RC(LS)·
· [Pj (LS|PGA)− Pj (LS + 1|PGA)] ·
∣∣∣∣dλc (PGA)d(PGA)
∣∣∣∣
)
d(PGA), (4.73)
while expected claims for flood policies are
afc =
∑
j
xfj,c (4.74)
with
xfj,c = x
(∫ ∞
0
RC
100
· P (NF ≥ 1) · gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
)
=
= P (NF ≥ 1) · x
(∫ ∞
0
RC
100
· gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
)
=
= P (NF ≥ 1) ·
(∫ δE
δD
RC
100
· gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ+
+
∫ ∞
δE
E · fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ
)
=
= P (NF ≥ 1) ·
(∫ δE
δD
RC
100
· gj(δ)fδ|NF (δ|NF ≥ 1)dδ+
+ E · λδ|NF (δE |NF ≥ 1)
)
. (4.75)
According to Hoeffding (1963), the bounds in eq. (4.28) and (4.39) sim-
plify for the case of bounded weighted random variables. Consider, for
instance, the bound as in eq. (4.28)
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φE
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y
g ])
]
, h1 > 0.
According to Lemma 1 in Hoeffding (1963), since the final term in the
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right-hand side of the inequality is convex, we know that:
E
[
e
h1
ng
(Y gt −E[Y
g ])
]
≤ e
h1
ng
E[Y gt ]
[
bg − E [Y g]
bg
+
E [Y g]
bg
e
h1
ng
bg
]
=
= e
h1
ng
E[Y g ]
[
1 +
E [Y g]
bg
(
e
h1
ng
bg − 1
)]
= eL(hg). (4.76)
L(hg) can be specified as
L(hg) = −hgpg + ln
(
1 + pg
(
ehg − 1
))
(4.77)
with
hg =
h1
ng
bg and pg =
E [Y g]
bg
.
According to the proof of Theorem 2 in Hoeffding (1963),
L(hg) ≤
1
8
h2g =
1
8
(
h1bg
ng
)2
, (4.78)
hence the bound can be rewritten as
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+ E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φ
(
e
1
8
(
h1bg
ng
)2)
=
=
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−h1φ+ 18
(
h1bg
ng
)2
. (4.79)
In order to get the best possible upper bound, we find the minimum of
the right-hand side of the inequality as a function of φ, thus obtaining
h1 =
4φn2g
b2g
. (4.80)
Substituting the parameter h1 as defined in eq.(4.80) into eq.(4.79), the
Hoeffding’s bound simplifies to
Prob
{
Yt > Ncφ+ E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−
2φ2n2g
b2g . (4.81)
Similarly, the bound in eq.(4.39) can be rewritten as
Prob
{
Yt > Ncγ + E [Y ]
}
<
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−
2γ2n2g
b2g . (4.82)
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4.5.4 Insurance Model
We now revise the insurance model by applying the distributional
assumptions in Section 4.5.3.
Once again, parameters φ and γ are obtained by fixing the desired
probabilities ε1 and ε2 equal to the right-hand side of inequalities (4.81)
and (4.82) respectively.
Premiums pHi are obtained as in Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, and p
G
i are
computed as in eq. (4.42). The optimal premium amount
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
imi is
again computed according to eq. (4.43).
While φ∗ and γ∗ remain unchanged as in eq. (4.52) and (4.51),
ε∗1 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−
2φ∗
2
n2g
b2g (4.83)
and
ε∗2 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−
2γ∗
2
n2g
b2g . (4.84)
Optimal values φ∗ and γ∗ here cannot be expressed as explicit functions
of ε∗1 and ε∗2 respectively, hence eq. (4.50)
W ∗d = Nc (φ
∗ − γ∗) ≥ 0
cannot be directly related to the two probabilities. However, the equation
implies φ∗ ≥ γ∗ and since ε∗1 and ε∗2 are inversely related to φ∗ and γ∗
respectively, the condition is satisfied if and only if
ε∗2 ≥ ε∗1. (4.85)
Similar to the special case h = h1 = h2, the model indicates that pro-
viding additional public resources should always be preferred to being
insolvent. Coherently, W ∗d = 0 is obtained if and only if ε
∗
1 = ε
∗
2. Of
course, the fund is again directly proportional to the number of munici-
palities Nc. Initial preferences ε1 and ε2 and claim distribution are now
reflected by φ∗ and γ∗ instead.
4.6 Results
The insurance model has been applied to the Italian residential build-
ing stock according to the assumption discussed in Section 4.5. Results
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Table 12: Public-private insurance scheme for earthquake risk management.
ε1 = 0.01, ε2 = 0.02
Deductible Excess of loss
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i c
W ∗d ε∗1 ε
∗
2(per square meter) (Mln) (Mln)
0 1500 10735.784 1.394 7970.726 0.010 0.061(0.000) (0.021) (0.080) (0.000) (0.035)
0 1200 9725.082 1.505 8563.810 0.010 0.080(0.000) (0.021) (0.073) (0.000) (0.030)
200 1500 8837.312 1.576 8582.130 0.010 0.095(0.000) (0.021) (0.068) (0.000) (0.027)
200 1200 8221.215 1.652 8771.088 0.010 0.112(0.000) (0.021) (0.065) (0.000) (0.024)
Note: results are based on 100 samplings over the Nc = 6404 municipali-
ties for which data were fully available. Policies are defined on deductible
and excess of loss and listed by row, while columns represent the model’s
relevant variables. Reported values are mean and coefficient of variation.
here presented refer to initial preferences ε1 = 0.01 and ε2 = 0.02. The
former value is representative of solvency requirement in Solvency II,
the latter has been fixed slightly greater than ε1 according to the model
description. In addition, we assumed r = 50 km, thus adopting a precau-
tionary hypothesis on spatial correlation. This criterion allows for multi-
ple sampling solutions, each resulting in different optimal values of the
relevant variables. Therefore, final results have been averaged over 100
samplings.
Four policies have been considered, differing on the level of de-
ductible (none or 200) and maximum coverage (none or 1200 per square
meter). Note that deductible equal to 0 corresponds to the absence of it,
while maximum coverage equal to 1500 per square meter indicates that
no maximum coverage applies.
Results for seismic policies are reported in Table 12, where relevant
variables are presented in terms of their mean and coefficient of variation
(CoV ). It can be noticed that the optimal premiums always corresponds
to the maximum price that individuals are willing to pay, pHi , as shown
by (i) c ≥ 1; (ii) the coefficient of variation of
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i equal to 0; and
(iii) ε∗1 = ε1. When interpreting these findings, there are two elements
that should be carefully evaluated: individuals’ risk aversion and spatial
correlation.
On one hand, because of risk aversion, individuals are keen to buy
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Table 13: Optimal seismic premiums per square meter.
Deductible 0 0 200 200
Excess of loss (per square meter) 1500 1200 1500 1200
RC.gl
min 0.460 0.460 0.034 0.034
mean 6.620 6.582 4.413 4.106
max 32.261 32.261 30.471 30.471
RC.sl
min 0.034 0.034 0.007 0.007
mean 2.005 1.676 1.351 1.350
max 10.226 10.226 8.922 8.683
A.gl
min 0.027 0.027 0.008 0.008
mean 1.902 1.712 1.536 1.424
max 10.200 10.197 9.269 9.124
A.sl
min 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011
mean 1.745 1.535 1.278 1.205
max 10.153 10.153 7.810 7.696
M
min 0.075 0.062 0.041 0.041
mean 4.461 3.910 3.975 3.544
max 50.182 40.042 31.387 30.926
Note: the Table shows the minimum, average and maximum premium at
the municipal level per each combination of structural typology (row) and
coverage limits (columns).
policies at a premium greater than their expected loss; the more indi-
viduals are risk averse, the higher is the amount of premium that the
insurer is able to collect and, in turn, the lower is the additional capital
needed to satisfy the solvency constraint ε1. On the other hand, spatial
correlation between individual risks inflate loss volatility and bumps the
tail of the aggregate loss distribution, thereby increasing the amount of
capital corresponding to ε1. Parameter c > 1 indicates that individual’s
risk aversion is not sufficient to tackle the risk-enhancing effect of spatial
correlation at the aggregate level.
As a consequence of c > 1, the premium pGi that would satisfy the
desired solvency constraint ε1 and capital re-investment probability ε2
does not meet market demand, and would generate a market failure.
This result suggests a potential weakness of the free market: since the
government has easier access to capital markets than private companies,
it is reasonable to assume that a private insurer will require a probability
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Table 14: Public-private insurance scheme for flood risk management.
ε1 = 0.01, ε2 = 0.02
Deductible Excess of loss
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i c
W ∗d ε∗1 ε
∗
2(per square meter) (Mln) (Mln)
0 1500 1021.072 5.644 7422.276 0.010 0.408(0.000) (0.035) (0.041) (0.000) (0.029)
0 1200 823.444 6.957 7567.733 0.010 0.534(0.000) (0.035) (0.040) (0.000) (0.028)
200 1500 1020.885 5.607 7366.177 0.010 0.402(0.000) (0.035) (0.041) (0.000) (0.029)
200 1200 823.257 6.898 7496.555 0.010 0.547(0.000) (0.035) (0.040) (0.000) (0.027)
Note: results are based on 100 samplings on Nc = 7772 municipalities for
which data were fully available. Policies are defined on deductible and ex-
cess of loss and listed by row, while columns represent the model’s relevant
variables. Reported values are mean and coefficient of variation.
of capital re-investment at most equal to the one desired by the govern-
ment; under this condition, pGi would be the minimum pure
2 premium
that traditional insurers would be able to charge to the homeowner, and
the policy would not be purchased. The result is even more significant
if we consider that the premiums pHi are estimated under assumptions
of rather favorable risk attitude of the population. In fact, empirical ev-
idence often suggests low risk-aversion of the homeowners, mainly due
to information asymmetries (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004). Therefore,
the optimal premiums p∗i identified here should be looked at as upper
bounds and the public-private insurance can set these rates only if cit-
izens have been properly informed and educated towards risks, or if a
mandatory insurance requirement has been introduced. Whatever the
real degree of risk aversion, it appears evident that the private sector
cannot meet the demand properly and achieve high penetration rates for
the whole national territory. This is perfectly consistent with the current
Italian situation: as reported by Cesari and D’ Aurizio (2019) 3, only 0.8%
of the housing stock is insured against earthquakes and insured homes
are largely located in areas at medium-low seismic risk.
Limiting coverage might help the insurer controlling risk’s volatil-
ity, thus allowing for lower premiums. In particular, being earthquakes
2Without profit load and expenses.
3See pp. 42.
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Table 15: Optimal seismic premiums per square meter.
Deductible 0 0 200 200
Maximum coverage (per square meter) 1500 1200 1500 1200
1 storey
min 2e-06 1e-06 2e-06 1e-06
mean 1.355 1.088 1.355 1.088
max 16.140 12.962 16.139 12.961
2 storeys
min 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16
mean 0.198 0.161 0.198 0.161
max 2.382 1.933 2.381 1.933
3 or more storeys
min 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16 1e-16
mean 0.182 0.147 0.182 0.147
max 2.188 1.771 2.187 1.770
Note: the Table shows the minimum, average and maximum premium at
the municipal level per each combination of structural typology (row) and
coverage limits (columns).
low frequency-high intensity perils, the aggregate loss distribution is
strongly affected by rare events causing severe damages and therefore
we expect maximum coverage to reduce the insurer’s financial expo-
sure more than deductibles. In Table 12 we can clearly notice that in-
creasing coverage limits reduces the overall minimum amount of re-
serves that should be guaranteed at the beginning of each year Wmin =∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i + W
∗
d , but the minimum capital requirement W
∗
d increases and
ε∗2 deviates more and more from the desired level. As confirmed by the
greater values of c, individuals are in fact reluctant to deductibles and
maximum coverage due to increasing risk aversion4. Coverage limits
negatively affect individual willingness to pay, that in turn lower their
contribution to reserves and the insurer is left with an enhanced financial
pressure. As said, limits-reluctance is here generated by risk-aversion,
but unfortunately c > 1 even for full-coverage policies, thus suggesting
the need for a government intervention on the private market.
Results for floods are collected in Table 14. Once again c > 1 and the
need for a government intervention in the insurance private market is
even more strongly suggested (higher value of c). However, deductibles
are here beneficial to the insurer and, in fact, both W ∗d and ε
∗
2 are lower
when D = 200 applies. Though findings are completely different from
4Risk aversion has been here represented by means of the utility function u(x) =
log(x) + 1, whose relative risk aversion coefficient is increasing in x.
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the seismic case study, this evidence still generates due to a combination
of risk aversion and loss distribution. Being high frequency-low inten-
sity perils, floods mostly cause small claims on relatively low return pe-
riods and the aggregate loss distribution therefore concentrates on low
values. On the other side, increasing risk aversion makes individuals
extremely averse to high losses and less concerned about low damages
that can afford by them own: in Table 15, when applying the deductible
D = 200, pHi remains substantially unchanged. Combining the two ef-
fects, deductibles relieve the insurer commitment while not substantially
modifying individual’s willingness to pay.
By contrast, introducing a maximum coverage worsens the insurer
condition by increasing both ε∗2 and W ∗d . This effect is clear when com-
paring the policy (D = 0, E = 1500) with the (D = 0, E = 1200) or
(D = 200, E = 1500) with (D = 200, E = 1200). This limit in fact dimin-
ishes the risk of the insurer by lowering the tail of its aggregate loss dis-
tribution but leaves highest level of individual risk to property-owners.
Because of increasing risk aversion, the premium individuals are will-
ing to pay is therefore much lowered, and the amount of public funds
needed much increased.
The most interesting result is obtained when comparing policies with
estimated losses in Section 3.5: though earthquakes produce expected
losses that are more than seven times greater than those from floods, the
minimum capital requirement W ∗d for the two hazards almost coincide.
Once again, the shape of the aggregate loss distribution and individual’s
increasing risk aversion jointly determine this surprising result. As low
frequency-high intensity perils, earthquakes sometimes produce enor-
mous damages that individuals are extremely concerned about. There-
fore, owners are willing to pay a premium consistently higher than their
expected loss. On the other side, floods happen quite more often but their
damages are usually minor and can mostly be afforded by homeowners
themselves. People are risk averse, and hence keen to buy a policy and
get rid of their flood risk, but the amount they are willing to pay for the
insurance protection is lower. In other words, both the two premiums are
higher than the corresponding expected loss but the difference between
the premium that the homeowner pays for the earthquake policy and its
expected seismic loss is greater than that of floods:
pH,si − E(L
s
i ) > p
H,f
i − E(L
f
i ). (4.86)
The higher is the difference between premiums and expected losses, the
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lower is the additional capital needed by the insurance in order to man-
age the risk, and hence the lower is the capital requirement W ∗d . This
becomes clear when considering the ratio
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i
W∗d
. Ratios for seismic
policies span between 0.93 and 1.34 and indicate that the government
and the homeowners almost equally contribute to the constitution of re-
serves. On the other side, flood risk is much unfairly distributed between
the two agents with ratios [0.11, 0.14].
Evidence suggests that spatial correlation strongly affects the devel-
opment of the private insurance market for both the two perils, but larger
values of ε∗2 indicate that flood risk is even more difficult to insure. A
second level risk transfer (such as a reinsurance contract or a catastrophe
linked securities) might help reducing ε2 by lowering the aggregate loss
tail.
To conclude, Figures 13 and 14 show annual optimal premiums per
square meter pHi for the most vulnerable structural typology per each
municipality for the two perils respectively. Since premiums are risk-
based, the two maps reflect the hazard component of risk modeling and
hence report a pattern similar to the maps on loss per square meter in
Figure 6 and 8.
4.7 Conclusion
In order to cope with the effects of natural risks, a public-private in-
surance scheme has been proposed. Our insurance model is intended to
alleviate the financial burden that natural events place on governments,
while at the same time assisting individuals and protecting the insurance
business. Therefore, in our model, property-owners, an insurer and the
government co-operate in risk financing. Though expected losses gener-
ated by floods and earthquakes are considerably different, we found that
the amount of public funds needed to manage the two perils is almost
the same. We argue that this evidence is generated by a combination of
individuals’ increasing risk aversion and hazard loss distributions.
Unfortunately, our results show that neither policy is sustainable by
the private market alone: due to spatial correlation among insured assets,
the maximum premiums that individuals are willing to pay do not meet
the insurer’s solvency or capital constraints for any policy considered.
Without the financial support of the government, a private insurer would
be forced to drive up premiums, which would not meet the demand and
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would therefore not be purchased.
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Figure 13: Optimal premiums per square meter for earthquake policies on
masonry buildings.
Note: the map refers to the full coverage (D = 0,E = 1500 per square
meter) policy, that has been estimated overNc = 6404. The minimum value
reported is 0.075 and therefore yellow municipalities should be interpreted
as approximately 0. The maximum premium is 50.182.
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Figure 14: Optimal premiums per square meter for flood policies on one-
storey buildings.
Note: the map refers to the full coverage policy (D = 0,E = 1500 per square
meter), that has been estimated over Nc = 7772.
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Chapter 5
Insuring multiple hazards
This Chapter is a joint work with my supervisors Giorgio Stefano Gnecco
and Fabio Pammolli. The full text of the article is also available from the arXiv
repository, preprint number 2006.05840.
Abstract
As well known in finance, merging portfolios is beneficial if
risks are uncorrelated, as floods and earthquakes are likely
to be. Here we extend the model defined in the previous
chapter to the multi-hazard scenario. Our analysis shows
that the hypothetical Italian public-private insurer can ben-
efit from risk differentiation by jointly managing earthquake
and flood risks through a multi-hazard policy: the amount of
public capital needed is lower than what would be necessary
if the two risks were managed separately. Another desirable
feature emerges: rates for multi-hazard policies are more ge-
ographically homogeneous, and therefore promote fairness
perception among the population. However, it emerged that
under no circumstances does the maximum premium that in-
dividuals are willing to pay match the desired insurer’s capi-
tal constraints.
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5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter a public-private insurance model has been
created for single peril policies. As well known in finance, merging port-
folios of different risks is beneficial if risks are uncorrelated, as floods and
earthquakes are likely to be. It remains to be seen whether benefits from
risk diversification counteract the negative impact of spatial correlation
emerged in previous results. This chapter goes through what has been
discussed so far and extends the analysis to multi-hazard.
The first section is devoted to risk assessment, and therefore comes
back to the risk-modeling introduced in Chapter 3. While assessing sin-
gle hazard risk is challenging, studying possible consequences from sev-
eral perils is even more complicated. Kappes et al. (2012) identifies two
major issues raising in a multi-hazard context: finding a common mea-
sure suitable to describing all the hazards considered, and understand-
ing the relationship linking them. Regarding the former issue, since it is
impossible to find a geological or atmospheric indicator describing both
flood and earthquakes, the two risk have been here assessed separately
and compared in monetary terms only. The second point refers to the
correlation between the two phenomena. Based on some empirical evi-
dence in the literature, we argue that the two risks are uncorrelated.
To our knowledge, Marzocchi et al. (2012) is the only work address-
ing multi-hazard risk assessment in Italy by studying seismic, volcanic,
hydrogeological, flooding, landslide and industrial risk in the municipal-
ity of Casalnuovo. However, this analysis is restricted to a municipality
and has been applied therein to human and societal risk only and does
not pursue any insurance decision. A different framework is therefore
needed for our case study.
The following section extends the insurance model in Chapter 4 to
multi-hazard. The model is shaped by redefining supply and demand.
In particular, we show that the maximum premium that individuals are
willing to pay is equal to the sum of the premiums for the two single
hazard policies, while the required amount of public capital is less than
or equal to the sum necessary when managing the risk separately.
The last section presents results, which clearly show that benefit from
risk diversification are not sufficient to override the effect of spatial corre-
lation. However, additional positive externalities emerge: for example,
premiums for multi-hazard policies are geographically more homoge-
neous with respect to the single hazard’s, thus favoring the perception of
fair-treatment among the population.
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5.2 Risk assessment
As discussed in Chapter 3, four elements determine losses from nat-
ural events : H , E, V and L. A mathematical model for loss estimation
should therefore be able to capture the relevant characteristics of each
component and describe those process that link them. Since every natu-
ral phenomenon has specific characteristics, studying the effects of mul-
tiple hazards furthermore complicates risk assessment.
In particular, in our two-peril framework, H should encompass both
floods and earthquakes and therefore a common physical measure able
to describe both the two perils should be identified. However, given the
different characteristics of the two perils, this is impossible, and we can
compare the two risks in money-value only. As a consequence, we are
forced to assess the two risks separately, though this approach cannot
capture the potential dependence among them.
In our multi-hazard risk assessment, we refer to two hazard-
indicators ζs and ζf , where apexes s and f indicate seismic and flood
risks, respectively. Each indicator is associated to a certain probability
of occurrence F s(ζs) and F f (ζf ). Hence, hazard is described by both
ζh and Fh(ζh). As we have previously shown, vulnerability functions
are defined over a specific hazard-indicator, and their output can be eas-
ily converted into monetary terms. Referring to the definition of loss in
Sections 3.3.4 and 3.4.4, for simplicity we convey L and V in a unique
function vh(ζh), with h = s, f . Expected losses per square meter gener-
ated by a peril can hence be estimated as
lh = Fh(ζh)vh(ζh)Eh, h = s, f. (5.1)
As anticipated, multi-hazard expected loss might be affected by potential
interactions of the two perils, and therefore we need some assumption
on the degree of dependence between floods and earthquakes. Unfor-
tunately, our database do not offer any information about if and how
the two perils interact, but some empirical analysis in the literature (Tar-
vainen, Jarva, and Greiving, 2006; Cesari and D’ Aurizio, 2019) support
the hypothesis of independence between seismic and flood risks. How-
ever, various degrees of independence are also possible. Following the
work of Brunette et al. (2015), we now discuss two possible indepen-
dence scenarios. First, we consider the hazards to be mutually exclusive,
thus assuming that floods and earthquakes cannot happen simultane-
ously and the structure can get damaged by one peril only; we will refer
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to this case as “mutual exclusion scenario”. As an alternative, we con-
sider perils to be “mutually independent”, allowing them to potentially
happen together. In this case, the property may be damaged by at least
one of the two events.
• Mutual exclusion scenario
If the two hazards are mutually exclusive the joint probability of
an event FMHdep is obtained by simply summing the single hazard
probabilities
FMHexc = F
s(ζs) + F f (ζf ), (5.2)
and we can compute expected losses per square meter as:
lMHexc = F
s(ζs)vs(ζs) + F f (ζf )vf (ζf ). (5.3)
We can notice that in case of mutually exclusion the multi-hazard
loss per square meter coincides with the sum of the single hazards
expected losses:
lMHexc = l
s + lf . (5.4)
• Mutual independence scenario
Avoid now any dependence and allow the hazards to happen si-
multaneously. The joint occurrence probability FMHind becomes:
FMHind = F
s(ζs) + F f (ζf )− F s(ζs)F f (ζf ). (5.5)
Expected losses now arise from flood, earthquakes, or a combina-
tion of the two. When the two events happen together the dam-
ages suffered by the property are defined by a new vulnerability
function vs+f (ζs, ζf ), therefore expected losses per square meter
are obtained as:
lMHind =
[
F s(ζs)− F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
]
vs(ζs)+
+
[
F f (ζf )− F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
]
vf (ζf )+
+ F s(ζs)F f (ζf )vs+f (ζs, ζf ) =
= F s(ζs)vs(ζs) + F f (ζf )vf (ζf )+
+ F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
[
vs+f (ζs, ζf )− vs(ζs)− vf (ζf )
]
=
= ls + lf + F s(ζs)F f (ζf )
[
vs+f (ζs, ζf )− vs(ζs)− vf (ζf )
]
. (5.6)
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We can notice that lMHind > l
MH
exc if vs+f (ζs, ζf ) > vs(ζs) + vf (ζf )
and this happens when the interaction of the two events amplifies the
damages they cause on the property. We are unable to define the func-
tion vs+f (ζs, ζf ) or to state whether it is smaller or greater than the
sum of the two single hazard vulnerability functions. However, the
low number of reported events suggests that the associated probabil-
ity F s(ζs)F f (ζf ) is reasonably close to 0. Moreover, assuming the ex-
pected multi-hazard loss lMHind equal to l
MH
exc is a prudential assumption
if vs+f (ζs, ζf ) < vs(ζs) + vf (ζf ) because it requires the insurer to create
slightly greater funds, thus effectively getting the probability of insol-
vency and fund-refill lower than the required level. For these reasons,
we estimate expected losses as:
lMHind = l
s + lf . (5.7)
5.3 Homeowner’s purchase decision
In Chapter 4 we have argued that premiums should meet the demand
and that maximum rates that individuals are willing to pay pose a con-
straint to an insurance model. Similar to the single-hazard policy, the
demand constraint in a multi-hazard framework is therefore given by
the equality:
uMHnot insured = u
MH
insured. (5.8)
Given the assumption of independence between floods and earthquakes
and the individual utility functions defined in Chapter 4, we can now ad-
dress the multi-hazard purchase decision problem. We refer to seismic
events by means of the apex s and flood by f , and for simplicity indi-
vidual loss li,t are indicated by lsi,t for earthquakes and l
f
i,t for floods. In
addition, single hazard and multi-hazard policies are specified by means
of apexes as SH and MH .
Given the probability of multiple events’ probabilities as defined in
eq. (5.2) and losses computed as in eq. (5.4), the reimbursement function
in eq. (4.1) becomes:
xMH =

0, with prob. πsc(0) + πfc (0),
xs = x
(
lsi,t
)
, with prob. 1− πsc(0), 0 < x
(
lsi,t
)
≤ lsi,t,
xf = x
(
lfi,t
)
, with prob. 1− πfc (0), 0 < x
(
lfi,t
)
≤ lfi,t,
(5.9)
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where i ∈ c and
xh = x
(
lhi,t
)
=

0 if lhi,t ≤ D,
lhi,t −D if D < lhi,t < E,
E −D if lhi,t ≥ E,
h = s, f. (5.10)
Hence, individual utilities of being and not being insured in eq. (4.4)-
(4.5) for multi-hazard policies are:
uMHnot insured =
[
πsc(0) + π
f
c (0)
]
u(RC) + [1− πsc(0)]u(RC − ls)+
+
[
1− πfc (0)
]
u(RC − lf ) (5.11)
and
uMHinsured =
[
πsc(0) + π
f
c (0)
]
u(RC − pMH)+
+ [1− πsc(0)]u(RC − pMH − ls + xs)+
+
[
1− πfc (0)
]
u(RC − pMH − lf + xf ). (5.12)
In Section 4.2 the maximum premium that an homeowner is willing to
pay for a single hazard policy is the quantity pSH solving the equality:
uSHnot insured = u
SH
insured. (5.13)
with
uSHnot insured = π
SH
c (0)u(RC) +
[
1− πSHc (0)
]
u(RC − lSH) (5.14)
and
uSHinsured = π
SH
c (0)u(RC−pSH)+
[
1− πSHc (0)
]
u(RC−pSH−lSH+xSH),
(5.15)
for SH = f, s.
Comparing MH and SH utilities, we get:
uMHinsured = u
MH
not insured = u
s
not insured + u
f
not insured =
= usinsured + u
f
insured. (5.16)
This equality states that the homeowner utility of buying both the two
single hazard policies is equal to the utility of buying a multi-hazard
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one. However, when evaluating one peril per time, policies prices are
fixed by solving a consume decision with two options - to buy or not
to buy the policy-, but a multi-hazard framework extends the range of
possible choice: the individual may decide to buy a MH policy, both
the SH policies, one out of the two SH , or neither of them. We know
that if the policy is priced at pSH the individual is indifferent between
buying or not the single-hazard policy, and eq. (5.16) states that the sum
of the two utilities equals the utility of buying a MH one. We should
then investigate the option of buying both the two single hazard policies
(s+ f ):
us+finsured ≥ u
s+f
not insured (5.17)
us+finsured =
[
πsc(0) + π
f
c (0)
]
u(RC − ps − pf )+
+ [1− πsc(0)]u(RC − ps − pf − ls + xs)+
+
[
1− πfc (0)
]
u(RC − ps − pf − lf + xf ) (5.18)
while
us+fnot insured =
[
πsc(0) + π
f
c (0)
]
u(RC)+
+ [1− πsc(0)]u(RC − ls + xs)+
+
[
1− πfc (0)
]
u(RC − lf + xf ). (5.19)
Note that the premium paid by the owner in this scenario is ps+f =
ps+pf . Assuming consumer’s perfect rationality and neglecting any op-
erational cost that a policy may generate, the individual prefers a multi-
hazard policy to two single-hazard ones if pMH < ps + pf because it
implies that uMHinsured > u
s+f
insured. Therefore
us+fnot insured = u
MH
not insured = u
s
not insured + u
f
not insured. (5.20)
which in turn implies:
us+finsured = u
MH
insured = u
s
insured + u
f
insured. (5.21)
Thus, the maximum premium that an individual is willing to pay for a
multi-hazard policy makes him indifferent between any purchase choice
and is equal to
pMH,H = ps + pf . (5.22)
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5.4 Public-private partnership
Main differences in risk-pooling single- or multi- hazard policies are
determined by the different loss, reimbursement and premium functions,
that are now described by eq. (5.4), (5.9) - (5.10) and (5.22).
We now construct the fund WMH for multi-hazard policies by ex-
tending the single-hazard model. The reader can find the extended de-
scription of the procedure in Section 4.3.
The multi-hazard fund at the beginning WMH,bt and at the end
WMH,et of the year t, are now:
WMH,bt = W
MH
t−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
pMHi mi = W
MH
t−1 +
Ni∑
i=1
(
psi + p
f
i
)
mi (5.23)
with
WMHt−1 = max(W
MH,e
t−1 ;W
MH
d ), (5.24)
and
WMH,et = W
MH,b
t −
Ni∑
i=1
xMHi,t mi = W
MH,b
t −
Ni∑
i=1
(
xsi,t + x
f
i,t
)
mi. (5.25)
Assume that an earthquake or a flood hits any building within a mu-
nicipality and that every policy can generate at most one claim per haz-
ard per year. Square meter expected losses lMHi,t are equal for all the indi-
viduals within the same municipality and so does xMHi,t . Given the num-
ber of inhabited squared meters Mc =
∑
i∈cmi, the total claims value
per municipality is:∑
i∈c
xMHi,t mi =
∑
i∈c
(
xsi,t + x
f
i,t
)
mi =
(
Xsc,t +X
f
c,t
)
Mc, (5.26)
and the total national amount is
YMHt =
Ni∑
i=1
xMHi,t mi =
Nc∑
c=1
∑
i∈c
xMHi,t mi =
Nc∑
c=1
(
Xsc,t +X
f
c,t
)
Mc =
= Y st + Y
f
t , (5.27)
and therefore is equal to the sum of the national claims for earthquakes
Y st and floods Y
f
t computed by means of eq. (4.18). We model claim
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probabilities by means of Bernoulli variables X̄sc,t ∼ Ber(qsc) and X̄
f
c,t ∼
Ber(qfc ) with qsc = πsc (ζs > ζD) and qfc = πfc
(
ζf > ζD
)
and apply equa-
tion (4.20):
YMHt =
Nc∑
c=1
(
X̄sc,ta
s
c,t + X̄
f
c,ta
f
c,t
)
. (5.28)
Assuming municipalities that are at least 50 km far each other to be inde-
pendent, we can recall the sample that have been created for single haz-
ard policies. Considering the two hazards separately, we will have Ng
groups of municipalities’ seismic risks and other Ng groups for floods.
Each group will contain ng municipalities:
Y s,gt =
∑
c∈g
X̄sc,ta
s
c,t c = 1, . . . , ng (5.29)
Y f,gt =
∑
c∈g
X̄fc,ta
f
c,t c = 1, . . . , ng (5.30)
such that
YMHt = Y
s,1
t + Y
s,2
t + · · ·+ Y
s,Ng
t + Y
f,1
t + Y
f,2
t + · · ·+ Y
f,Ng
t . (5.31)
Defining wg =
ng
Nc
, the expected total amount of claims in Italy is:
E
[
YMHt
]
= E
[
YMH
]
=
Ng∑
g=1
wg
(
E [Y s,gt ] + E
[
Y f,gt
])
, (5.32)
with E [Y s,gt ] and E
[
Y f,gt
]
computed as in (4.23).
Applying the Hoeffding (1963) bound as in eq.(4.27)-(4.34), we get to the
definition of both insolvency probability and Wd. We fix the insolvency
probability ε1:
ε1 = e
−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E(Y
s,g+Y f,g)E
[
e
h1
ng
(Y s,gt +Y
f,g
t )
]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E(Y
s,g+Y f,g)E
[
e
h1
ng
(Y s,gt )e
h1
ng
(Y f,gt )
]
=
= e−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E(Y
s,g+Y f,g)E
[
e
h1
ng
(X̄sc,ta
s
c,t)e
h1
ng
(X̄fc,ta
f
c,t)
]
, (5.33)
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and since seismic and flood risk are independent:
ε1 = e
−h1φ
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng E(Y
s,g+Y f,g)E
[
e
h1
ng
(X̄sc,ta
s
c,t)
]
E
[
e
h1
ng
(X̄fc,ta
f
c,t)
]
=
= e−h1φ
(
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng (E(Y
s,g)+E(Y f,g))∏
c∈g
MX̄sc,tasc,t
(
h1
ng
)
∏
c∈g
MX̄fc,tafc,t
(
h1
ng
))
=
= e−h1φ
(
Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h1ng (E(Y
s,g)+E(Y f,g))ρ
)
(5.34)
with
ρ =
∏
c∈g
MX̄sc,tasc,t
(
h1
ng
)
MX̄fc,tafc,t
(
h1
ng
)
. (5.35)
The minimum capital requirement for a multi-hazard public insurance is
WMHd = Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
(
psi + p
f
i
)
mi (5.36)
with
φ =
1
h1
log
∑Ngg=1 wge− h1ng (E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))ρ
ε1
 (5.37)
The probability of fund-refill ε2 and the minimum amount of premiums∑Ni
i=1 p
MH,G
i mi that the insurer needs given a certain Wd are obtained by
applying the Hoeffding (1963) bound as in (4.36)-(4.42). Hence, fixing
ε2 = e
−h2γ
 Ng∑
g=1
wge
− h2ng (E(Y
s,g)+E(Y f,g))ρ
 (5.38)
we get
Ni∑
i=1
pMH,Gi mi = Ncγ + E [Y ] (5.39)
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where γ is computed as:
γ =
1
h2
log
∑Ngg=1 wge− h2ng (E(Y s,g)+E(Y f,g))ρ
ε2
 (5.40)
5.5 Insurance model
The model for the definition of a public-private insurance scheme
with multi-hazard policies can be defined as in Section 4.4, therefore here
we briefly extend the model to the multi-hazard scenario, but the reader
can refer to the previous Section for technical details.
The two fundamental conditions are now defined by equations (5.22)
and (5.39). The optimal premium p∗MHi is estimated as:
pMH
∗
i = min(c, 1) · p
MH,H
i with c =
∑Ni
i=1 p
MH,G
i mi∑Ni
i=1 p
MH,Hmi
, (5.41)
from which we obtain
Ni∑
i=1
pMH
∗
i mi = min
(
c,
1
c
)
Ncγ + E [Y ] = Ncγ
∗ + E [Y ] , (5.42)
and the optimal probability of fund-refill ε∗2:
ε∗2 =
∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h2ng (E(Y
s,g)+E(Y f,g))ρ
eh2γ∗
, (5.43)
where γ∗ is
γ∗ =
min
(
1, 1c
)
(E [Y ]−Ncγ)− E [Y ]
Nc
. (5.44)
The optimal WMH
∗
d is estimated as in equation (4.47):
WMH
∗
d = max
{
Ncφ+ E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
pMH
∗
i mi; 0
}
=
= Ncφ
∗ + E [Y ]−
Ni∑
i=1
pMH
∗
i mi = Nc (φ
∗ − γ∗) , (5.45)
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with
φ∗ =
W ∗d +
∑Ni
i=1 p
MH∗
i mi − E [Y ]
Nc
, (5.46)
and the optimal value ε∗1 is:
ε∗1 =
∑Ng
g=1 wge
− h1ng (E(Y
s,g)+E(Y f,g))ρ
eh1γ∗
. (5.47)
As in the single-hazard scenario, some distributional assumptions are
needed in order to solve the model. We keep the assumptions as in Sec-
tion 4.5.3, and therefore we represent Yt as a weighted sum of Bernoulli
random variables. We assume that the properties within a municipality
are perfectly correlated. Hence, the Hoeffding (1963) bound simplifies
and the probabilities ε∗1 and ε∗2 become:
ε∗1 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−
2φ∗
2
n2g
b2g (5.48)
and
ε∗2 =
Ng∑
g=1
wge
−
2γ∗
2
n2g
b2g , (5.49)
where
b2g =
∑
c∈g
asc + a
f
c . (5.50)
5.6 Results
For multi-hazard analysis, only municipalities where both seismic
and flood data are available have been considered, thereby restricting
the database to Nc = 6217.
As in Section 4.6, municipalities have been assumed independent if
centroids are at least 50 km far and 100 samplings have been considered
for final results. The four policies considered for single hazard policies
have also been estimated for multi-hazard: (i) a full coverage policy (D =
0, E = 1500); (ii) one with a maximum coverage equal to 1200 per square
meter (D = 0, E = 1200); (iii) one with a deductible equal to 200 (D =
200, E = 1500); (iv) a policy with both the maximum coverage and the
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deductible (D = 200, E = 1200). Initial preferences have been again
fixed to ε1 = 0.01 and ε2 = 0.02.
Results are presented in Table 16 together with the corresponding sin-
gle hazard policies, that have been re-estimated on the restricted number
of municipalities for the sake of comparability. As expected, seismic risk
dominates the multi-hazard scenario because of the consistently higher
impact on the national territory. In particular, since
Ni∑
i=1
pMH∗i =
Ni∑
i=1
ps∗i +
Ni∑
i=1
pf∗i , (5.51)
we can notice that multi-hazard premiums amount
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i is mostly
determined by seismic risk and just a small portion of it is due to floods.
Though premiums for the two single hazard policies are extremely dif-
ferent, the corresponding minimum capital requirement W ∗d is similar
(see Section 4.6), and for the multi-hazard policy
WMH∗d ≤W s∗d +W
f∗
d . (5.52)
Therefore, multi-hazard policies need for less public capital than man-
aging the two hazards separately, and this finding is attributable to risk
differentiation.
However, advantages from multi-hazard are evident with respect to
flood risk, but a bit controversial when we look at the seismic risk. The
multi-hazard parameter c is a bit greater than that of the seismic case and
much smaller than in the flood case but, unfortunately, is always c ≤ 1.
Our analysis suggests that benefits from risk differentiation are not suf-
ficient for the natural risks to be entirely managed by the private market
and once again, a government intervention is highly recommended. This
evidence is confirmed by the probability ε∗2, that shows a behavior similar
to c and is always greater than the desired level, and ε∗1 = ε1. Moreover,
public-private insurances typically transfer the highest layers of risk to
a public reinsurer or through a State guarantee, and this further helps
limiting the insurer’s losses while keeping premiums low. In a fully pri-
vate environment the cost of reinsurance is always higher, further exac-
erbating the difficulties of the private market to fulfill both the solvency
requirement and policyholder’s willingness to pay (Paudel, Botzen, and
Aerts, 2013; Paudel, Botzen, Aerts, and Dijkstra, 2015).
As far as coverage limits concern, the minimum amount of public
funds W ∗d and the minimum probability ε
∗
2 are obtained with the full
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coverage policy, while applying a deductible D = 200 or a maximum
coverage E = 1200 lead to similar results. In any case, the worst solution
would be applying the two limits together, since both the greatest W ∗d
and the highest ε∗2 are here obtained.
In addition to benefits from risk differentiation, a government may
prefer multi-hazard policies for another interesting feature: risk-based
premiums are much more geographically uniform than those of single
hazards. In fact, Figure 15 mapping premiums for the most vulnerable
buildings (masonry-one storey) shows a quite homogeneous price at the
municipal level, while differences are a bit more emphasized in the cor-
responding single hazard (see Figures 13 and 14). From the public sector
perspective, a uniform rating system is desirable because it weakens the
perception of unequal treatment between the property-owners from dif-
ferent areas and therefore allows easier acceptance by the population. On
the other hand, different risk-based premiums signal the riskiness of the
area to its inhabitants and is therefore important to discourage the con-
struction of most vulnerable housing structures and to encourage pre-
ventive behavior. The current rating also preserves this desirable feature
since premiums are defined on structural typologies among which rates
substantially vary (see Table 17).
5.7 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that the amount of public capital necessary for
insuring earthquakes and floods can be reduced by jointly managing the
two risks. Along with this benefit from risk differentiation, multi-hazard
policies allow the insurer to apply rates that are more geographically ho-
mogeneous, therefore favoring the perception of fair treatment among
the population. Unfortunately, our results show that not even multi-
hazard policies meet the insurer’s solvency or capital constraints. Once
again, evidence suggests the need for the government to intervene in the
insurance market for natural disasters. However, our results for single-
peril and multi-peril policies show that the probability of the government
having to inject further capital may be moderate. Though the insurance
scheme reduces the government’s financial burden due to natural perils
with respect to the current state, adding some layer of risk transfer might
be beneficial. For example, CatBonds or some level of reinsurance may
reduce losses suffered by the government and their volatility.
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Table 16: Multi-hazard public-private insurance scheme.
ε1 = 0.01, ε2 = 0.02
Deductible Excess of loss
∑Ni
i=1 p
∗
i c
W ∗d ε∗1 ε
∗
2(per square meter) (Mln) (Mln)
0 1500
MH 11185.123 1.694 13281.008 0.010 0.091(0.000) (0.024) (0.068) (0.000) (0.029)
S 10356.859 1.424 8194.243 0.010 0.063(0.000) (0.022) (0.080) (0.000) (0.035)
F 828.264 6.346 7359.961 0.010 0.403(0.000) (0.036) (0.044) (0.000) (0.029)
0 1200
MH 10046.430 1.852 13983.445 0.010 0.120(0.000) (0.024) (0.063) (0.000) (0.025)
S 9378.433 1.537 8760.141 0.010 0.082(0.000) (0.022) (0.074) (0.000) (0.030)
F 667.997 7.820 7469.278 0.010 0.427(0.000) (0.036) (0.043) (0.000) (0.028)
200 1500
MH 9335.925 1.919 13879.044 0.010 0.132(0.000) (0.024) (0.061) (0.000) (0.024)
S 8507.814 1.612 8766.645 0.010 0.097(0.000) (0.022) (0.069) (0.000) (0.027)
F 828.110 6.305 7305.976 0.010 0.396(0.000) (0.036) (0.044) (0.000) (0.029)
200 1200
MH 8575.042 2.047 14183.694 0.010 0.163(0.000) (0.024) (0.058) (0.000) (0.022)
S 7907.199 1.692 8945.297 0.010 0.114(0.000) (0.022) (0.066) (0.000) (0.024)
F 667.843 7.756 7401.415 0.010 0.435(0.000) (0.036) (0.043) (0.000) (0.028)
Note: the Table shows multi-hazard (MH), seismic (S) and flood (F) insur-
ance for the Italian residential building stock. Results have been estimated
over 100 samplings on Nc = 6217 municipalities for which data were fully
available for both flood and earthquakes. Policies are defined on deductible
and excess of loss and listed by row, while columns represent the model’s
relevant variables. Reported values are mean and coefficient of variation.
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Table 17: Optimal multi-hazard premiums per square meter.
Deductible
0 200
1s 2s 3s 1s 2s 3s
Ex
ce
ss
of
Lo
ss
(p
er
sq
ua
re
m
et
er
)
15
00
RC.gl
min 0.644 0.592 0.591 0.051 0.051 0.051
mean 7.541 6.730 6.719 5.322 4.512 4.500
max 32.261 32.261 32.261 30.471 30.471 30.471
RC.sl
min 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.012 0.008 0.008
mean 2.932 2.122 2.110 2.195 1.384 1.373
max 16.951 10.679 10.638 16.935 9.277 9.248
A.gl
min 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.021 0.021 0.021
mean 2.849 2.038 2.027 2.478 1.667 1.656
max 19.136 10.793 10.730 19.111 9.625 9.595
A.sl
min 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015
mean 2.684 1.873 1.862 2.221 1.410 1.399
max 18.860 10.283 10.272 18.614 8.165 8.136
M
min 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.058 0.058 0.058
mean 5.383 4.573 4.561 4.898 4.088 4.077
max 50.428 50.218 50.215 31.387 31.387 31.387
12
00
RC.gl
min 0.644 0.589 0.588 0.038 0.035 0.035
mean 7.315 6.666 6.656 4.818 4.169 4.159
max 32.261 32.261 32.261 30.471 30.471 30.471
RC.sl
min 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.011 0.008 0.008
mean 2.428 1.779 1.770 2.133 1.484 1.474
max 13.964 10.583 10.549 13.910 8.962 8.938
A.gl
min 0.031 0.028 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.008
mean 2.469 1.820 1.811 2.175 1.526 1.517
max 15.046 10.648 10.596 14.109 9.339 9.315
A.sl
min 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.015
mean 2.286 1.637 1.627 1.958 1.308 1.299
max 13.952 10.258 10.250 13.608 7.985 7.960
M
min 0.068 0.063 0.062 0.045 0.042 0.041
mean 4.641 3.992 3.983 4.275 3.626 3.616
max 40.891 40.168 40.157 30.926 30.926 30.926
Note: the table is divided in four sub-tables, each representing a specific
combination of deductible (by column) and excess of loss (by row). Each
sub-table presents minimum, average and maximum premium at the mu-
nicipal level per each combination of structural typology (row) and number
of storeys (column).
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Figure 15: Optimal multi-hazard premium per square meter for one storey
masonry buildings.
Note: the map represents a full coverage (D = 0, E = 1500 per square me-
ter) policy, that has been estimated on Nc= 6217. The minimum value rep-
resented is 0.092 and therefore yellow municipalities should be interpreted
as approximately 0. The maximum premium reported is 50.428.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future
Developments
This thesis investigates the role of public-private partnerships in in-
surance for the management of natural disasters. Chapter 2 highlights
the importance of co-operation between institutions and private individ-
uals to achieve adequate risk reduction, which must pursue both miti-
gation and financing interventions. Although some countries have al-
ready joined successful public-private partnerships, some fragility in the
systems have frequently shown up, largely linked to an insufficient un-
derstanding of the risks and to development plans that were not consis-
tent with natural risk management objectives. Where data are lacking,
a better dialogue with the whole community can allow for a greater un-
derstanding of the actual risk of the overall society. Much of the gov-
ernment’s efforts must be directed towards listening to and actively in-
volving the poorest and marginalized segments of the community, which
constitute the most vulnerable layer of the population and have the
greatest need for public support in the aftermath of an event. Involving
and empowering all individuals also reduces risk by promoting more
careful behavior. Likewise, it is important that governments ensure a
coherent plan of action, aiming for responsible and controlled develop-
ment.
In an increasingly interconnected and dangerous world, distinguish-
ing risks and responsibilities is increasingly difficult and therefore
public-private partnerships, especially in the insurance sector, are in-
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creasingly necessary. However, there are a number of critical issues in
defining these partnerships, primarily dictated by the lack of informa-
tion on natural hazards. Chapter 3 addresses this problem and presents
an analysis of the risk of earthquakes and floods in Italy that allows to
estimate expected losses in the absence of historical data. We found that
seismic risk results in the highest expected losses at national level, but
floods may generate the highest losses per square meter. The two perils
differ in geographic extent: while the seismic risk is relevant for almost
all the national territory, floods affect a limited area.
Chapter 4 deals with a further criticality of public-private insurance
schemes: coordinating the different objectives pursued by the entities in-
volved in the partnership. Insurers aim for profit and must guarantee
compliance with certain solidity and solvency requirements, the govern-
ments need to guarantee protection for the entire population, and prop-
erty owners show limited willingness to pay for insurance policies. A
public-private insurance scheme must therefore both protect the solid-
ity of the insurance industry and protect citizens, and should do so by
avoiding overexposure of public assets. Chapter 4 proposes an insurance
scheme with these characteristics and presents an application to Italian
municipalities. The results show that, though expected losses generated
by floods and earthquakes are considerably different, the amount of pub-
lic funds needed to manage the two perils is almost the same.
As frequently happens, Italy is exposed to multiple natural risks that
can have significant impacts and require important amounts of public
funds. Chapter 5 extends the insurance model to the multi-hazard case
and shows that in Italy the amount of public capital necessary for risk
financing can be reduced by jointly managing earthquakes and floods.
Along with this benefit from risk differentiation, multi-hazard policies
allow the insurer to apply rates that are more geographically homoge-
neous, therefore favoring the perception of fair treatment among the pop-
ulation. Unfortunately, our results suggest that neither single- or multi-
hazard policies in Italy are sustainable by the private market alone. With-
out the government, a private insurer would be forced to drive up pre-
miums, which would not meet the demand and would therefore not be
purchased. This result suggests the need for the government to intervene
in the insurance market for natural disasters.
Since losses are quite high for the public sector too, our results sug-
gest the need to introduce a mechanism for transferring the highest risk
layers from the insurer to a third party. To this end, it might be inter-
esting to explore the introduction of a public reinsurer and measure its
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impact on premiums and public funds needed. Alternatively, the public-
private insurer can issue CatBonds. In particular, these would allow the
public sector not to have to set up and manage a specific entity, and at
the same time could sufficiently relieve insurance from the burden of ex-
treme losses.
The estimates obtained here are based on the hypothesis that indi-
viduals are risk-averse with full access to information. Therefore, when
looking for the maximum premium they are willing to pay, we have ap-
plied a utility function with risk aversion coefficient equal to 1. In prac-
tice, however, it is difficult to quantify the risk aversion of individuals
who often show behaviors that are a little more risk neutral. The intro-
duction of a risk aversion parameter in the utility function and its cali-
bration on real data could offer new insights.
A further aspect that may deserve further studies is the role of the
public sector on the market with respect to private insurers: here we have
assumed that the government imposes the sale of a single product on the
market, but free competition could change the balance between citizens
and insurers. Citizens, or at least those living in lower risk areas, could
in fact have more offers to choose from, and private insurance, which
would be free to manage their customer portfolio as they prefer, could
offer them a lower premium. It is therefore likely that private compa-
nies will take over the less risky areas, leaving the public insurer with an
extremely risky portfolio and thus exposing the government to a greater
probability of losing public funds.
At last, in this work we have decided to analyze the two natural phe-
nomena that most afflict the Italian territory. However, Italy is also af-
fected by other risks, among which landslides and volcanic eruptions,
which could be introduced into the multi-hazard policy. Extending our
insurance model by introducing the correlation between the typologies
of risks covered would allow for the construction of more comprehen-
sive policies. There are also other aspects of the risks studied here that
deserve further study, including the effect of climate change on flood es-
timates and the consequent adjustment of premiums.
The research projects carried out in this thesis have led to two further
works that still constitute my research today. Together with my advisor
Fabio Pammolli and Giovanni Bonaccorsi, we are furthering investigat-
ing the vulnerability of the Italian municipalities. Our work aims at the
definition of an index representing the financial vulnerability to natural
risks. The index will contain and relate information about natural riski-
ness, demographic framework, and financial status of the municipalities.
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During my visiting period in Wellington, New Zealand, I initiated a
further research project with my visiting supervisor, prof. Ilan Noy, and
Francesca Marta Lilja Di Lascio. We are working on the definition of a
risk-based premium for earthquake insurance in New Zealand that cap-
tures the effect of spatial correlation among insured assets. As already
discussed in this thesis, natural disasters are characterized by spatial
micro-correlations which are difficult to capture but might increase the
likelihood of extreme events. The non-homogeneous distribution of pop-
ulation over the national territory coupled with high seismic exposure
makes the effect of spatial correlation extremely relevant in the Coun-
try. In fact, New Zealanders tend to gather in big cities, while extensive
areas are left completely uninhabited. Therefore, an earthquake hitting
a densely inhabited city will trigger several claims, while a similar or
stronger earthquake far enough from those cities may not damage any
asset. Including micro-spatial correlation in rating allows for the identifi-
cation of critical areas that may challenge the insurance business and en-
sures that insurers build the reserves needed to cope with tail events. In
order to properly represent annual losses, we are implementing a multi-
level regression model.
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